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Action: Shall Silence Reign?
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Since antiquity, society has confronted the problems occasioned by
the presence of the physically and mentally handicapped. I The federal
government has recently adopted a new approach to these problems:
the integration, to the maximum extent feasible, of handicapped individuals into the mainstream of American society. The passage of the
Rehabilitation Act of 19732 is certainly the most significant achieve*
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1. Concern for the plight of the handicapped is evidenced at least as early as the Old
Testament, which admonishes that "you shall not treat the deaf with contempt, nor put an
obstruction in the way of the blind." Leviticus 19:14 (New English Bible, Oxford Univ.
Press 1970).
For recent literature on the plight of the handicapped today, see PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, ONE IN ELEVEN-HANDICAPPED ADULTS IN

AMERICA-A SURVEY BASED ON 1970 U.S. CENSUS DATA 19; Burgdorf & Burgdorf, AHistory of Unequal Treatment- The Qual~fcations ofHandicappedPersons as a "Suspect Class"
under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975); Wolff, Protecting
the DisabledMinority: Rights andRemedies under Sections 503 and 504 ofthe Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 25 (1978); Note, Abroad in the Land- Legal Strategies to
Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501 (1973).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-961
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The Rehabilitation Act has been amended twice, in 1974 and in
1978. See notes 68, 78 & accompanying text infra.
The Senate report on the bill that, with some amendments not relevant for present
purposes, was ultimately enacted in 1973 indicated that Congress intended to have handicapped individuals more fully integrated into American society. The report observed particular problems suffered by the handicapped, including "employment discrimination, lack of
housing and transportation services and architectural and transportation barriers." S. REP.
No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2078.
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee stated that it had "added provisions
to the bill designed to focus research and training activities on making employment and
participation in society more feasible for handicapped individuals." Id at 2092. Similar
comments were also made on the floor of the Senate during the debate that preceded the
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ment in that process.
This Article considers whether a private cause of action can be
implied under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. 3 This section imposes certain obligations concerning the employment of "handicapped
individuals ' 4 on contractors and subcontractors who hold contracts
passage of the Rehabilitation Act. See, eg., 119 CONG. REc. 24,566 (1973) (remarks of Sen.
Cranston).
The concept of "mainstreaming" the handicapped into the general population is most
clearly articulated in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88
Stat. 1617 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-961 (1976)). Title Inl, designated as the "White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act," stated Congress'
"final objective" to be "the complete integration of all individuals with handicaps into normal community living, working, and service patterns." Pub. L. No. 93-516, tit. III, §§ 30001, 88 Stat. 1617, 1631 (1974).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 503(a) provides, in part, that
"[a]uy contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency for the
procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the
United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out
such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to
employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section
706(7) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979).
Section 503(b) concerns administrative complaints filed with the Department of Labor
alleging that a federal contractor has failed to comply with the provisions of its federal
contract with respect to the employment of handicapped individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b)
(1976). See note 66 infra.
Section 503(c) provides for waivers of the obligations imposed by section 503 b the
President of the United States if the national interest so requires because of "special circumstances." 29 U.S.C. § 793(c) (1976).
4. The term "handicapped individual" is defined for the purposes of Title V of the
Rehabilitation Act, which includes § 503, as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. III 1979). In regulations implementing § 503, the Department of
Labor has provided that "a handicapped individual is 'substantially limited' if he or she is
likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in employment because of
a handicap." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1980).
The number of individuals protected by Title V of the Rehabilitation Act greatly exceeds the number of individuals who presently possess a physical or mental handicap..
Clauses (ii) and (iii)
of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) protect individuals who are no longer handicapped, although they were handicapped in the past, and individuals who are perceived as
being handicapped, even though in fact they are not handicapped. This point is illustrated
in Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977). The plaintiff sought employment as a policeman with the City of Tampa but was rejected because of a history of childhood epilepsy. Id at 76. The City's policy was to exclude from consideration all individuals
with a history of epilepsy. The plaintiff introduced unrebutted medical evidence that "he
had outgrown [his childhood epilepsy] and was at present perfectly able to serve from a
medical perspective as a policeman." Id Although the district court denied the plaintiffs
motion for a preliminary injunction because no irreparable harm was threatened, id at 79, it
subsequently found that the City had violated the plaintiff's rights under the Rehabilitation
Act. Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954, 955 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
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5
with the federal government for amounts in excess of $2,500.
The question whether a private cause of action can be implied
under section 503 has been raised in more than twenty cases. The leading case on this point is Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc. ,6 in which the Fifth
Circuit refused to imply a cause of action. All of the other four circuit
courts of appeals 7 and a substantial majority of the district courts8 that

5. A person or firm becomes a federal contractor and subject to the strictures of § 503
when it enters into a contract or subcontract for an amount in excess of $2,500 with "any
Federal department or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
services (including construction)." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979).
6. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
7. Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United Air
Lines, 662 F.2d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226,
1244 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1084 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 889 (1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir. 1979). Strong
dissents were written in three of these cases. Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d at 867,
(Fletcher, J., concurring and dissenting); Davis v. United Air Lines, 662 F.2d at 127 (Kaufman, J., dissenting); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1085 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
8. District courts have refused to imply a cause of action under § 503 in thirteen cases.
Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 864 (D. Ariz. 1981); Reynolds v. Ross, 25 F.E.P.
Cases (BNA) 462, 466-67 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Simon v. St. Louis County, 23 F.E.P. Cases
(BNA) 1315, 1321 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Elliston v. Ralston Purina Co., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 1 31,079 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Moon v. Santa Fe Ry., 22 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1252, 1253
(D. Kan. 1980); Langman v. Western Elec. Co., 488 F. Supp. 680, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Coleman v. Noland Co., 21 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1248, 1249 (W.D. Va. 1980); Doss v. General Motors Corp., 478 F. Supp. 139, 141 (C.D. IUI. 1979); Miglets v. Erie Lackawanna Ry.,
19 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 379, 380 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 468
F. Supp. 934, 940 (E.D. Ohio 1979); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202-03
(N.D. Tex. 1977), af'd, 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980);
Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 1977), afl'd sub nom.,
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980);
Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (D. Del. 1977).
A private cause of action has been implied under § 503 by six district courts. California
Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125, 131 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Clarke v. FELEC
Servs., 489 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Alaska 1980); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F.
Supp. 1165, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 76 (N.D.
Cal. 1979); Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954, 955 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (alternative
holding); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Confusion about the existence of a cause of action under section 503 clearly exists. In
Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp. 1165, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), for example,
a private cause of action was implied under § 503 in January 1980 by a court in the Southern
District of New York. Less than two months later, another court in the same district, without referring to the Chaplin decision, refused to imply a cause of action under § 503.
Langman v. Western Elec. Co.., 488 F. Supp. 680, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
The commentators are also divided on whether a cause of action can or should be
implied under § 503. Some commentators have concluded that a private cause of action
should be implied. Note, Implied Rights of Action under the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 68
GEO. L.J. 1229, 1230 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Implied Rights ofAction]; Note, Private
Rights ofActionfor HandicappedPersonsunder Section 503 ofthe RehabilitationAct, 13 VAL.
U.L. REV. 453, 476-92 (1979). Other commentators have taken different positions. Guy, The
Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunityfor the Handicapped: An Overview and
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have considered this question also have concluded that a private cause
of action should not be implied under section 503. Virtually all of the
cases involving section 503 take the position that the implication of a
private cause of action under that statute depends on the application of
the four-part test set forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash 9 for
determining the propriety of implying a cause of action under any
statute.10
This Article concerns the intersection of two evolving areas of the

law: the rights of the handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act and
the means by which those rights may be enforced, and the principles

governing the implication of private rights of action. This Article uses
the Cort criteria to analyze both the cases and the available legislative
materials concerning section 503 to determine whether a cause of action should be implied under section 503. As only one reported decision has found that section 503 did not satisfy the fourth Cort factor,"I
only the first three Cort factors are analyzed in this Article. The Article
Analysis of the MajorIssues, 7 U. BALT. L. REv. 183, 194-95 (1978) (implication of a private
cause of action is doubtful); Wright, -EqualTreatment of the Handicappedby Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65, 95-96 (1977) (private right of action should not be implied);
Note, Employment Rights ofHandicappedIndividuals: Statutory andJudicialParameters,20
WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 291, 299 (1978) ("[E]fforts to enforce section 503 through private
judicial means will most likely prove unsuccessful.").
9. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See note 27 & accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v.
United Air Lines, 662 F.2d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629
F.2d 1226, 1237-38 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
11. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 203 (N.D. Tex. 1977), af'd on other
grounds, 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980). Although the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the § 503 suit, it expressly overruled the
district court's determination that the fourth factor was not satisfied, concluding that protection of the rights of the handicapped is not a matter traditionally relegated to state law.
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889
(1980).
All the other courts that have considered the question have concluded that the fourth
factor does not present an obstacle to the implication of a private cause of action under
§ 503. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1981) ("This area is
clearly one of federal concern."); Davis v. United Air Lines, 662 F.2d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1981)
("[l]t is plain enough that discrimination against the disabled has not been a matter traditionally relegated to state law."); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1238 n.23
(7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 889 (1980).
In approximately half of the reported cases, the courts did not consider the fourth Cori
factor, having concluded that a cause of action should not be implied because of the failure
to satisfy one or more of the first three Cort factors. See, e.g., Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611
F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir. 1979); Reynolds v. Ross, 25 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 462, 465 (N.D.N.Y.
1981); Simon v. St. Louis County, 23 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1315, 1321 (E.D. Mo. 1980);
Langman v. Western Elec. Co., 488 F. Supp. 680, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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concludes that a private right of action can and should be implied
under section 503 despite the overwhelming weight of judicial authority to the contrary.
One of the principal goals of the Rehabilitation Act is the expansion of employment opportunities for the handicapped in both the public and private sectors. 12 The inclusion of this goal is appropriate
because, as a practical matter, individuals precluded from employment
13
because of their handicaps are effectively segregated from society.

Nevertheless, handicapped individuals appear to be the victims of significant employment discrimination.' 4 It has been estimated that there
are approximately twenty-eight million adults in the United States with
12. As originally enacted, the Rehabilitation Act contained a lengthy eleven-point congressional "Declaration of Purpose." Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (repealed
1978). One of those express goals was to promote and expand employment opportunities in
the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in
employment. Id In addition, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act stated that
one of the purposes of the Act was "to ensure [that] any qualified handicapped individual
shall be given full and fair consideration for employment by any contractor who seeks to
contract with the Federal Government." S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2123. In 1978, the Rehabilitation Act was
amended by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Development Disabilities Act
of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-961 (Supp. III 1979)). The 1978 Amendments shortened the declaration of purpose
to provide, in its entirety, that "[tihe purpose of this chapter is to develop and implement,
through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive
and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living." 29 U.S.C.
§ 701 (Supp. III 1979).
Noting this modification, the Seventh Circuit concluded that it does not represent any
significant change in Congress's intent to promote employment opportunities for the handicapped. Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1233 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1980).
A further indication of its commitment to expanding employment opportunities of the
handicapped is Congress's failure to repeal or weaken sections 501 and 503 of Title V of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), the sections that expressly
address employment of the handicapped by the federal government and federal contractors.
13. An analogous situation was presented during the consideration of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), which
generally prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, and
national origin. During the course of the debate on that provision, the proponents of Title
VII argued that blacks and other minority groups could not become part of the mainstream
of American society as long as they were subject to employment discrimination: "Without a
job, one cannot afford public convenience and accommodations. Income from employment
may be necessary to further a man's education, or that of his children. If his children have
no hope of getting a good job, what will motivate them to take advantage of educational
opportunities?" 110 CONG. REC. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
14. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). That report, a study on the
existence of employment discrimination against the disabled, concluded that during a single
year "[t]he total loss of earnings suffered by working white male disabled workers due to
labor market discrimination was estimated to be about $4.5 billion." Id at 5 (footnote
omitted).
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physical or mental handicaps. 15 It has been asserted that from seven to
fourteen million of these individuals are employable' 6 but that only
17
800,000 of them are in fact employed.

Section 503 requires that each contract entered into by a federal
department or agency with a federal contractor for an amount in excess
of $2,500 contain a clause requiring the contractor to "take affirmative

action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped

individuals."' 8 It has been estimated that the federal contractors sub-

ject to section 503 employ more than one-third of the American work
force.' 9 Although the affirmative action clause is in the form of a con-

tractual provision, in effect it is a non-negotiable obligation imposed
upon federal contractors subject to section 503.20 The affirmative action obligation of a federal contractor, however, extends only to handicapped individuals who are qualified to perform the job in spite of their
handicaps. 21 Although section 503(b) expressly creates an administrative remedy for the handicapped, 22 the Rehabilitation Act is silent with

respect to whether a handicapped individual may maintain a private
suit against a federal contractor that has allegedly violated its affirmative action obligations. For millions of unemployed handicapped individuals, the question whether a private cause of action can be implied
under section 503 has tremendous practical significance. If their only
remedy is the express administrative remedy provided in section
503(b), then the value of the statutory rights created in favor of handi15. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare noted estimates that there are
between 28 and 50 million Americans with physical or mental handicaps. S. REP. No. 1297,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 6373, 6400.
16. 118 CONG. REC. 3321 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); see also Hearingson H.
8395 Before the Subcommn on the Handicapped, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1972).
17. 118 CoNG.REC. 3321 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); see also S. REP.No. 319,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979).
19. Lowering Barriers PressuredCompanies Decide that Disabled Can Handle More
Jobs, Wall St. J.,Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 1. One federal agency has estimated that § 503
prohibits employment discrimination by approximately 300,000 federal contractors and subcontractors. See S. RP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979).
20. Department of Labor regulations provide that the affirmative action clause "shall
be considered a part of every contract... required by the [Rehabilitation] Act... whether
or not it is physically incorporated in such contracts and whether or not there is a written
contract between the agency and the contractor." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.23 (1980).
21. Section 503(a) imposes an obligation on federal contractors only with respect to
"qualified handicapped individuals." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979). The Department
of Labor has defined a "qualified handicapped individual" as "a handicapped individual
...who is capable of performing a particular job, with reasonable accommodation to his or
her handicap." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1980).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976). See note 66 infra.
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capped individuals depends entirely on the ability of the Department
of Labor (DOL) to dispose of administrative complaints promptly and
efficiently. 23 The DOL has taken the position that it lacks the enforcement resources necessary to investigate and resolve expeditiously the
growing backlog of administrative complaints ified under section 503.24
Cort v. Ash
In Cort P. Ash, 25 the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test
that provides the analytical framework for determining the propriety of
the implication of a private cause of action under a statute that does not
expressly authorize such a remedy. Cort involved a derivative lawsuit
by a stockholder against corporate directors alleging a violation of the
criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. section 610,26 which has since been repealed, that prohibited corporate contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections. Although section 610 provided only
criminal sanctions, the plaintiff sought damages predicated upon an
implied private cause of action. In Cort, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the attempt to imply a cause of action, stating:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the
plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor
of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
...Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
27
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
23. There are other methods by which § 503 could be enforced. Congress could obviate the need for an implied cause of action by granting an express cause of action for the
violation of § 503. A possible legal strategy for redressing violations of § 503 is a suit
brought by a handicapped individual against a federal contractor as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the government and the federal contractor. In a case refusing to
imply a cause of action under § 503, the court expressly noted that it was not passing upon
the merits of a suit predicated upon a third-party beneficiary theory. Rogers v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1079 n.5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980). For additional
legal strategies for enforcing § 503, see Note, PrivateRights of Actionfor HandicappedPersons under Section 503 of the RehabilitationAct, 13 VAL. U.L. REy. 453 (1979).
24. Although the DOL initially took the position that a cause of action should be implied under § 503, it has altered its stance. See notes 278-98 & accompanying text infra.
25. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
26. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 610, 62 Stat. 683, 723 (repealed 1976).
27. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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Cori therefore may be construed as requiring the satisfaction of all of
the four tests for a cause of action to be implied.
The Supreme Court concluded that none of the four tests favored
implication under section 610.28 With respect to the first factor, the
Court determined that Congress's motivations in enacting section 610
were "the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which
corporations exercised through financial contributions and the feeling
that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for
contributions to political parties without the consent of the stockholders."'29 The Court concluded, however, that the legislative history of
section 610 "demonstrates that the protection of ordinary stockholders
was at best a secondary concern."' 30 Accordingly, the plaintiff-stockholder in Cort was not one for whose "especial" benefit section 610 was
enacted. The Court concluded that the second test was not satisfied
because nothing in the legislative history of the statute manifested a
congressional intent to create a private remedy, and it was "at least
dubious" that Congress intended to confer special rights on corporate
shareholders. 3 1 In addition, the third of the four tests was not satisfied
because the implication of a private cause of action "would not aid the
primary congressional goal." 32 Finally, the fourth factor was not satisfied because it was "entirely appropriate" to33relegate derivative lawsuits against corporate directors to state law.
The First Cort Test
[l]s the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
is, does the statute create a federal right in
statute was enacted"--that
34
favor of the plaintiff?
The Supreme Court has referred to this first test as the "threshold
question"; unless a court first determines that the relevant "statute was
enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member,". consideration of the other three factors is unnecessary. 35 Several
courts considering actions brought under section 503 have concluded
28. id at 80-85.
29. Id at 80 (quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948)).
30. Id at 81.
31. Id at 82-83.
32. Id at 84.
33. Id at 84-85.
34. Id at 78 (emphasis in original).
35. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979). One commentator has
asserted that fulfillment of this criterion is dispositive in favor of the implication of a private
right of action. Seng, PrivateRights of,4ction, 27 DE PAUL L. Rv.1117, 1123 n.30 (1978).
This position is no longer tenable in light of Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444
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that the first Cort test was satisfied. 36 Other courts, however, although
assuming that the first test was satisfied for the purpose of deciding a
motion to dismiss, have suggested that the absence of "right-creating
phrases" in section 503 has made the implication of private causes of
37
action more difficult.
The Fifth Circuit examined the first Cort factor in 1980 in Rogers
v. Frito-Lay, Inc. ,38 seeking to determine whether section 503 conferred
a clearly defined "federal right" on the handicapped. 39 Rogers involved a consolidated appeal from two judgments dismissing suits
predicated upon an implied cause of action under section 503.40 The
court upheld the dismissals by both district courts. The majority indicated that satisfaction of the first Cori test turns on two factors. First,
the statute must identify a particular class of persons of which the
plaintiff is a member. Second, the court must determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.4 1 The
Rogers majority recognized that section 503 identified the handicapped
as the relevant class and that, at least for the purpose of their appeals,
the plaintiffs in both of the district court decisions were within the relevant class.
Although the Rogers court stopped short of concluding that the
first Cort test was not satisfied, it suggested that implication of a cause
of action under section 503 was "more difficult" because the statute did
not "clearly define a right inhering in individual members of a benefitted class."'4 2 The Second Circuit, in Davis v. UnitedAir Lines, 43 and the
Seventh Circuit, in Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co.,44 have followed
U.S. 11 (1979), in which the Supreme Court declined to imply a cause of action despite
satisfaction of the first Cort test. Id at 19-24.
36. See Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1981); California Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Simon v. St. Louis
County, 23 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1315, 1317-19 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Clarke v. FELEC Servs.,
489 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D. Alaska 1980); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp.
1165, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Coleman v. Noland Co., 21 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1248, 1249
(W.D. Va. 1980); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 68 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Duran
v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954, 955-56 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (by implication); Drennon v.
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
37. See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1239-40 (7th Cir. 1980);
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
38. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
39. Id at 1079-80.
40. Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
41. 611 F.2d at 1079.
42. Id. at 1080.
43. 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981).
44. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
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Rogers in concluding that section 503 may not satisfy the first Cort
45
test.
The Supreme Court stated in a footnote in Cannon v. University of
Chicago46 that "the right- or duty-creating language of the statute has
generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action." 47 Although Rogers, Davis, and Simpson all
relied on this statement, neither they nor Cannon mandated the use of
any prescribed "right- or duty-creating" language. At most, they suggested that the presence of such language made the implication of a
48
private right of action more probable.
Moreover, Cannon suggests that certain language may be functionally equivalent to use of the word "right." In that case the Supreme
Court observed that "this Court has never refused to imply a cause of
action where the language of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case." 49 In
support, the Court quoted the statutory language from eight cases in
which it had implied a cause of action.5 0 Of these eight examples of
what the Cannon Court stated were explicit statutory conferrals of a
right, only five statutes contained the word "right." The other three
merely used imperative language, which the court treated as
equivalent. 5 1
For example, in Virginian Railway . System FederationNo. 40,52
the statute in question stated that "the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified. .... -53 The Court emphasized the word "representative" because that term identified the class involved. The
obligation imposed is found in the words "the carrier shall treat with,"
a phrase that places upon the carrier the duty to bargain with the employee's representative. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded
that a right of action could be implied under the statute.
Similarly, in Texas & New Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood of
Railway & Steamsho Clerks54 and in Texas & Pac4i'c Railway V.
45. See 662 F.2d at 122-23; 629 F.2d at 1239-40.
46. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
47. Id at 690 n.13.
48. Davis v. United Airlines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1240 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d
1074, 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
49. 441 U.S. at 690 n.13.
50. id at 690-91 n.13.
51. Id
52. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
53. Id at 544 (emphasis added by the Court).
54. 281 U.S. 548 (1930). The statute at issue provided that "representatives. . . shall
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Rigsby,55 the Court implied private causes of action from statutes that
did not include the word "right" in describing the class of persons protected or the benefit conferred upon them. These three cases make it
clear that a statute can create a federal right in favor of a particular
class without employing the word "right. '5 6 The common denominator in all three cases appears to be the identification of the relevant
class and, as indicated by the word "shall," the imposition of some duty
upon another party.
By citing these three cases in Cannon, the Supreme Court has
adopted an interpretation of an explicit statutory conferral of a right
broad enough to include section 503. That section provides, in part,
that "the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative
action to employ. . . qualified handicapped individuals. . .. -57 As
in the three cases cited in Cannon, section 503 identifies the relevant
class--qualified handicapped individuals-and mandates that employers fulfill a duty-the duty to take affirmative action. It can be maintained, therefore, that this language "explicitly" confers a right on
handicapped individuals under the Cannon approach. Accordingly,
even if, as Cannon suggests, "the right- or duty-creating language of the
statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety
of implication of a cause of action," 58 section 503 meets that test.
The Supreme Court's "right- or duty-creating language" analysis,
as articulated in Cannon, is so broad that a seemingly endless number
of statutes would appear to confer a federal right on one class or another in satisfaction of the first of the four Cort tests. Accordingly, it
would not be surprising if the Supreme Court retreated from the posibe designated by the respective parties... without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either party .... Id at 567.
55. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The Court implied a duty and a cause of action in favor of
"any employee of any such common carrier." Id at 40. The language from the Rigsby
opinion which is quoted in Cannon is not accurate but the inaccuracy is immaterial. Id
56. The most recent of the three decisions was rendered in 1930, and, as the Supreme
Court expressly indicated in Cannon, not until 1972 did the Court become much more restrictive in the implication of private causes of action: "[Djuring the period between the
enactment of Title VI in 1964 and the enactment of Title IX in 1972, this Court had consistently implied remedies-often in cases much less clear than this. It was after 1972 [that is,
after the enactment of Title IX] that this Court decided Cort v. Ash and the other cases cited

by the Court of Appeals in support of its strict construction of the remedial aspect of the
statute." 441 U.S. at 698 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). In light of its decision
in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), it can be argued that the

Court has become even more restrictive in implying private rights of action than was suggested in Cannon. See notes 185-93 & accompanying text infra.

57. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979).
58.

441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979).
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tion that a statute "explicitly" confers a federal right on a class simply
by identifying a particular class and using the word "shall," followed
by some statutorily imposed duty.
Rogers advances three additional arguments in support of its position that the language of section 503 makes the implication of a cause
of action difficult because it fails to "create a federal right in favor of
the [handicapped] plaintiff."59 Each argument merits individual
analysis.
A Duty Is Directly Imposed Only Upon Federal Departments and Agencies
The Rogers court stated that the language of section 503 "merely
requires those who give out federal contracts to obligate contractors to
take affirmative steps to employ and advance handicapped persons.
The duty it directly creates is imposed upon federal departments and
agencies, not upon contractors. ' 60 This assertion ignores the express
language of section 503, which requires that contracts with federal contractors "shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons
to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States
shall take affrmative action to employ and advance in employment
"61 The language quoted indiqualified handicapped individuals ... .cates that there are two "shall" or duty-imposing provisions in section
503: first, the contract shall contain an affirmative action provision;
and second, the party contracting with the United States shall, because
of its contractual obligations, take affirmative action. The Rogers opinion emphasizes the former while virtually ignoring the existence of the
latter.
Although the Rogers court implicitly recognized that section 503
imposes some obligation on federal contractors, it suggested that that
obligation is only an indirect one. The court implied that, in contrast,
the duty imposed on federal agencies is a significant "direct" one. This
distinction, however, elevates form over substance. In enacting section
503, Congress's purpose was not to lengthen federal contracts or to increase the responsibilities of government agencies. Rather, Congress
sought to benefit handicapped individuals by increasing the employment opportunities open to them,6 2 and elected to accomplish this goal
by imposing on federal contractors the obligation to take affirmative
action to employ and to advance in employment qualified handicapped
59.
60.
61.
62.

611 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
Id at 1079 (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
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individuals. Accordingly, the substance of section 503 is the imposition
of obligations on federal contractors, and not on agencies. The ministerial, almost trivial, nature of the agencies' "direct" obligation to ensure that the affirmative action clause is inserted in federal contracts is
demonstrated by the fact that the regulations promulgated by the DOL
to implement section 503 make the affirmative action clause binding on
a contractor whether or not it is physically incorporated in the
63
contract.
Moreover, the regulations implementing section 503 indicate that
the DOL construes the section to impose an obligation on federal contractors. One of these regulations provides that "[u]nder the affirmative action obligation imposed by section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, contractors are required to take affirmative action to employ
and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals at all
levels of employment. . . ."64 The DOL's construction of that statute
is entitled to considerable deference because it is the government

agency charged with enforcing section

503.65

Section 503(b) expressly grants an administrative remedy if a
handicapped individual files a complaint with the DOL against any
contractor. 66 The provision for an administrative remedy does not, by
itself, prove that Congress intended to create an implied private cause
of action. The creation of this federal administrative remedy against
the contractor, however, does presuppose that Congress intended both
to confer a "federal right" on the handicapped and to provide a means
67
for redressing a violation of that federal right.
The Rehabilitation Act was amended by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978 (1978
63.
64.

See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(a) (1980).

65. "[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.
...
Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (footnote omitted); see also Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251 (1978); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965).
66. "If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has failed or refuses to

comply with the provisions of his contract with the United States, relating to employment of
handicapped individuals, such individual may fie a complaint with the Department of Labor. The Department shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take such action
thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant .... " 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976). DOL
regulations set forth the procedure to be followed upon receipt of a complaint from a handicapped individual. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.26 to .32 (1980).
67. The ultimate question, of course, is whether Congress intended this federal right to
be remedied by private lawsuit. The first Cort test, however, inquires only into the existence
of that federal right. See notes 34-59 & accompanying text supra.
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amendments).6 8 Those amendments added section 505(b), which provides for the award of attorneys' fees to "the prevailing party, other
than the United States," in "any action or proceeding to enforce or
charge a violation of a provision of this title [which includes section
503]."69 By providing for an award of attorneys' fees to either successful party, except the United States, the statute clearly contemplates that
the contractor could be a party defendant in a private action to enforce
section 503. Furthermore, section 505(b) presupposes the existence of a
federal right in favor of the handicapped, and, conversely, the imposition of a duty on federal contractors. It would be anomalous to speak
of "an action. . to enforce or charge a violation" of section 503, if
section 503 did not confer rights on the handicapped that might be violated. As a matter of logic, a federal contractor cannot violate a nonexistent duty. Therefore, the enactment of section 505(b) demonstrates
that Congress believed, at the time it enacted the 1978 amendments,
that it had previously imposed an obligation on federal contractors
under section 503.
In light of the foregoing, the assertion in Rogers that section 503
imposes a "direct" duty "merely" on federal agencies and not on federal contractors is untenable.
No Clearly Defined Right Conferred on the Handicapped

The Rogers court contended that section 503 "does not confer a
clearly defined right on the benefitted class."'70 The court, however,
apparently failed to perceive that the phrase "affirmative action" is a
term of art that includes the obligation not to discriminate. The duty
not to discriminate has been recognized as giving rise to a clearly defined right.71 Congress has enacted statutes that prohibit employment
72
discrimination based on factors such as sex, race, and national origin.
There can be little doubt that these antidiscrimination statutes confer a
clearly defined right on the protected classes. Similarly, if Congress
had substituted in section 503 the phrase "shall not discriminate in em68. Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978). The Rehabilitation Act had also been
amended in 1974. See note 78 & accompanying text m.fia.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. II 1979). The legislative history of the 1978 amendments indicates that the award of attorneys' fees would be permitted in suits predicated
upon § 503. See notes 226-68 & accompanying text infra.
70. 611 F.2d at 1079.
71. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Bossier Parish
School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
72. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
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ployment against" for the phrase "shall take affirmative action to employ," the handicapped would have a clearly defined right to be
protected from discrimination as that phrase is used in Rogers.
The right to be free from handicapped-based discrimination is incorporated in section 503's broader mandate of affirmative action.
Prior to the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, the term "affirmative
action" had been construed by both the Seventh Circuit and the Attorney General, in another civil rights context, to impose "more than the
merely negative obligation not to discriminate. ' 73 Moreover, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress did intend section 503 to prohibit discrimination. In that history there is a
Senate Report on a bill that, although not ultimately enacted, contained a provision identical to section 503 as enacted. The report stated
that one purpose of that provision was to provide a remedy for the
handicapped individual "who has a discrimination complaint against
'74
[a] Federal contractor.
In addition, the DOL has construed section 503 to prohibit discrimination. In its regulations implementing section 503, the DOL
promulgated an affirmative action clause for insertion into federal contracts that provides that "the contractor will not discriminate" and that
it further "agrees to take affirmative action to employ, advance in employment and otherwise treat qualified handicapped individuals without discrimination based upon their physical or mental handicap in all
employment practices . . -75 As the DOL is the agency charged
with enforcing section 503, its construction of that statute is entitled to
great deference. 76 In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "the
affirmative action clause inserted in federal contracts pursuant to [section 503] bans discrimination on the basis of handicaps. ' 77 If it is assumed, arguendo, that the "affirmative action" obligation of a federal
contractor does not encompass the obligation not to discriminate, then
the DOL would have exceeded its authority by promulgating its regulations in their present form. This argument, however, is absent from
73. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1969); accord Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie,
471 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1972) (interpreting Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 169,

170 (1974), which obligates federal contractors to take affirmative action "to ensure that
applicants are employed. . . without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin"). This duty to take affirmative action toward the handicapped implicitly includes the
duty not to discriminate against them.
74. S.REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprintedin 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2076, 2123.
75. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4 (1980).

76.

See note 65 & accompanying text supra.

77.

611 F.2d at 1079 n.5.
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any reported case involving section 503, including Rogers. This suggests that there is tacit agreement that the DOL's regulations do not
exceed its authority.
Finally, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974 (1974 amendments) 78 provides additional support for the
conclusion that Congress intended the affirmative action obligation to
impose a duty not to discriminate and thus did confer a clearly defined
right on the benefited class. The Senate Report on the 1974 amendments stated that Congress's intent was "that sections 503 and 504 be
administered in such a manner that a consistent, uniform and effective
Federal approach to discrimination against the handicapped persons
would result."' 79 Furthermore, the report stated that a new definition of
handicapped individual "has been developed which would provide sufficient latitude . . . particularly for the nondiscrimination programs
carried out under sections 501, 503, and 504 with respect to the employment of handicapped individuals. . . under Federal contracts .... "80
In light of the overwhelming support for the position that section
503 prohibits, at an absolute minimum, handicapped-based discrimination, the assertion by the Fifth Circuit in Rogers that section 503 fails to
confer a "clearly defined right" on the handicapped cannot be supported. The handicapped do have a right under section 503: the
clearly defined right to be free from discrimination predicated upon
their handicaps.
No Right of Affirmative Action in Every Case
The third argument of the Rogers court is that section 503 does not
intimate "that every qualified handicapped person has a right to affirmative action in his particular case."8 1 This argument, reiterated by the
Seventh Circuit in Simpson, s 2 is a product of confusion concerning the
term of art "affirmative action." A hypothetical is useful in clarifying
the confusion.
Assume that an employer has one hundred jobs available. Assume
further that three hundred qualified nonhandicapped and one hundred
qualified handicapped individuals apply for those positions. Must the
employer hire all one hundred of the qualified handicapped individuals
78. Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974).
79. S.REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprintedin 1974 U.S.
NEWS 6373, 6391.
80. Id at 63, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6413.
81. 611 F.2d at 109.
82. 629 F.2d at 1240.

CODE CONG.

& AD.
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and none of the qualified nonhandicapped individuals? It is possible
that the Rogers and Simpson courts have incorrectly concluded that if
the phrase "affirmative action" were construed to impose a clearly defined duty, the answer to the question would have to be yes. Accordingly, Rogers and Simpson conclude that not "every qualified
handicapped person has a right to affirmative action in his particular
case,"' 83 by which the courts appear to mean that not every qualified
handicapped person has a right to one of the available jobs. The
courts' conclusion is correct, but their reasoning is faulty. "Affirmative
action" does not require that all of the qualified handicapped individuals be hired to the exclusion of the nonhandicapped; it does require, at
a minimum, that no qualified handicapped individual be denied em84
ployment because of his or her handicap.
In summary, section 503 does clearly confer a federal right on
handicapped individuals. Accordingly, the first of the Cort tests is
satisfied.
The Second Cort Test
[1]s there any indication of legislative intent, 85explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
The satisfaction of the second Cori test is the most formidable obstacle to the implication of a cause of action under section 503. The
determination of "legislative intent" is especially difficult because it requires the resolution of a number of interrelated legal issues in an unsettled area of the law.
Until recently, the Supreme Court used an analytical approach
that had the practical effect of minimizing the significance of the
second Cort factor. In 1979, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v.
Lewis,8 6 however, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of
congressional intent in implying a private cause of action.8 7 Furthermore, the Court indicated that the phrase "legislative intent" required
83.

611 F.2d at 109.

84. Delineating the precise boundaries of what is permissible or required by the term of
art "affirmative action" in § 503 will, no doubt, be an arduous and protracted process. Cf
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979) (private, voluntary race-conscious "affirmative action" plan does not necessarily violate Title VII's prohibition on racial
discrimination).
85. 422 U.S. at 78.
86. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
87. "The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by
implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction. . . . [Wihat must ultimately be
determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted .
Id
at 15-16 (citations omitted).
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not merely an intent to confer a special benefit on a particular class, but
also an intent to make the right conferred enforceable through private
8
lawsuits.
The inquiry into legislative intent begins with an examination of
the language of the relevant statute.8 9 The language of section 503 of
the Rehabilitation Act does not suggest that Congress contemplated a
private remedy. In addition, the contemporaneous legislative history of
the Rehabilitation Act is silent with respect to the availability of a private right of action under section 503.90
Section 503(b), however, does contain an express administrative
remedy that can be initiated by a handicapped individual who believes
that a federal contractor has failed to comply with its affirmative action
obligations. 91 There is nothing in the legislative history of section 503
to support the conclusion that this express remedy was intended to be
the exclusive remedy for violations of section 503. The availability of
this remedy, however, has led many courts to apply the principle of
expfressio unius est exclusio alterius, which states that "the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another," 92 in refusing to imply a private
cause of action under section 503. 93 In fact, reliance upon the principle
of expressio unius appears to be the most significant justification for the
refusal of courts to imply a private remedy under section 503. Thus, a
crucial issue in the implication of a cause of action under section 503 is
the propriety of using expressio unius when there is no other indication
that Congress intended the express remedy to be the exclusive
94
remedy.
The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 197495 and 1978.96 Several
88. "[The Investment Advisers] Act's legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress
intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations [on investment advisers] .... But
whether Congress intended additionally that these provisions would be enforced through
private litigation is a different question." Id at 17-18 (citations omitted).
89. See id at 16; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979).
90. See Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d at 1240.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976).
92. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
93. See, ag., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 889 (1980); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 861 (D. Ariz. 1981); Simon v.
St. Louis County, 23 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1315, 1321 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Coleman v. Noland
Co., 21 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1248, 1249 (W.D. Va. 1980); Langman v. Western Elec. Co., 488
F. Supp. 680, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934, 937
(E.D. Ohio 1979). The only § 503 case to reject an exporessio unius argument is Hart v.
County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 74 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
94. See notes 101-93 & accompanying text infra.
95. See note 78 & accompanying text supra.
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district courts have taken the position that the legislative histories of the
1974 and 1978 amendments demonstrate that Congress intended a private cause of action to exist under section 503.97 Most courts, however,
have rejected these arguments. 98 The attempts to rely upon the 1974
and 1978 amendments as indications of Congress's intent in enacting
section 503 raise two issues: first, whether the subsequent legislative
history of a statute can be used in the construction of the original statute;99 second, whether the 1974 and 1978 amendments shed light on
Congress's intention in enacting section 503.100
Expressio Unius and a Silent Legislative History
There is no contemporaneous legislative history for section 503.
Assuming, arguendo, that the 1974 and 1978 amendments cannot be
considered in construing section 503 because they constitute subsequent legislative history, then it is necessary to discern Congress's intent from a silent legislative history. The issue then becomes whether a
cause of action can be implied when the legislative history of the relevant statute is silent and the statute provides an express remedy.
In Cort, the Supreme Court limited the significance of a silent
legislative history: unless the history evinces a clear intent to deny a
private remedy, a silent legislative history does not preclude the implication of a private cause of action if a right has been clearly conferred
upon a class to which the plaintiff belongs.' 0 '
Cort involved a civil suit for damages and other relief for violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibited corporations from making ex02
penditures in connection with certain specified federal elections.
The shareholders' derivative suit was based upon an implied cause of
action because section 610 was a criminal statute, which did not pro96.

See note 68 & accompanying text supra.

97. See California Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); Clarke v. FELEC Servs., 489 F. Supp. 165, 168-69 (D. Alaska 1980); Chaplin v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp. 1165, 1170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hart v. County of

Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 73-74 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
98. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v.
United Air Lines, 662 F.2d 120, 123-26 (2d Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629
F.2d 1226, 1241-43 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1081-83 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 861-62 (D.
Ariz. 1981); Langman v. Western Elec. Co., 488 F. Supp. 680, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934, 936-38 (E.D. Ohio 1979).

99.
100.
101.
102.

See notes 194-207 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 208-68 & accompanying text infra.
422 U.S. at 82.
See id at 68-70.
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vide any express authority for a private remedy. The Supreme Court
concluded that the legislative history of section 610 was silent with respect to whether Congress intended "to vest in corporate shareholders a
federal right to damages for violation of § 610."103 Accordingly, the
Court was faced with a factual situation similar to the one presented by
section 503: it was required to determine "legislative intent" from a
legislative history that was silent on this point. In dictum, the Court
maintained that "in situations in which it is clear that federal law has
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an
intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling."' 4 Thus, under Cort, if the plaintiff establishes that federal rights are clearly
conferred on a particular class, and the third and fourth Cort factors
are satisfied, a private remedy may be implied, unless the defendant
establishes that the legislative history of the statute demonstrates an
"explicit purpose" to deny a private cause of action. The plaintiff need
not demonstrate a congressional intent to provide a private remedy. In
Cort, however, the third and fourth factors were not satisfied, and the
Court found thht creation of a federal right in favor of shareholders
was "at best a subsidiary purpose of § 610."105 The Court acknowledged that it could normally expect few insights from a legislative history when the statute itself was silent.
In Cannon, the plaintiff sought to imply a private right of action
under section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.106
The Supreme Court concluded that there was ample contemporaneous
and subsequent legislative history to demonstrate Congress's intent to
create a private remedy under section 901.107 In dictum, however, the
Court suggested that the second Cori test would rarely be helpful in
ascertaining legislative intent, stating that "the legislative history of a
103. Id at 82.
104. Id (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
105. Id at 80. The Court's refusal to imply a private cause of action does not appear to
be based on the fact that the legislative history was silent. The Court stated: "Where as
here, it is at least dubious whether Congress intended to vest in the plaintiff class rights
broader than those provided by state regulation of corporations, the fact that there is no
suggestion at all that § 610 may give rise to a suit for damages or, indeed, to any civil cause
of action, reinforces the conclusion that the expectation, if any, was that the relationship
between corporations and their stockholders would continue to be entrusted entirely to state
law." Id at 82-84 (footnote omitted). Section 503 is distinguishable from the statute at issue
in Cort, however, because it is clear that Congress intended to grant the handicapped a
federal right. See notes 35-84 & accompanying text supra.
106. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
107. 441 U.S. at 694-703.
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statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will
typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question [of legislative
intent]." 108
The combined effect of the Cort and Cannon decisions is to assign
relatively little weight to the second Cort test. There can be little disagreement with Cannon's prediction that statutes that are silent concerning private causes of action typically will be supported by silent
legislative histories.' 0 9 It is unlikely that many difficult cases concerning the implication of causes of action would arise if the legislative histories of the relevant statutes were explicit about the availability or
nonavailability of private lawsuits. Moreover, the Cori and Cannon
courts did not view the lack of a clear congressional intention either to
create or to deny a private remedy to be a significant obstacle to the
implication of a cause of action.
Expressio Unius in TransamericaMortgageAdvisors v. Lewis and Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington
In two post-Cannon cases, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v.
Lewis' 0 and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,' the Supreme Court
appears to have shifted its emphasis. The Transamerica Court relied
upon the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius together with the
silent legislative history to reject an implied cause of action. ' 2 The
Touche Ross Court appeared to exhibit a limited reliance on expressio
unius.1 3 These applications of expressio unius appear to contrast
sharply with the Court's rejection, in Cort, of the use of that principle
in the absence of supporting legislative history."14 Furthermore, Transamerica ascribed much more significance to the second Cor factor
than did either Cori or Cannon.
Touche Ross involved the question whether a cause of action could
be implied under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act),' ' which requires registered broker-dealers to file certified
108. Id at 694.
109. Although the majority opinion in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979), was hostile to implication, it agreed that the legislative history of a statute at
issue in an implication case would typically be silent. See id at 18.
110. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
111. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
112. 444 U.S. at 19-21.
113. 442 U.S. at 571-72.
114. 422 U.S. at 82 n.14. For a discussion of Cort's rejection of expressio unius, see notes
158-60 & accompanying text infra.
115. 15 U.S.C. 78q(a) (1976). Section 17 provides, in part, that "[elvery national securities exchange, member thereof, broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities
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financial statements with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
The suit was brought on behalf of the customers of an insolvent brokerdealer against the accounting firm that had prepared the allegedly inaccurate financial statements.1 1 6 The Second Circuit had found an implied cause of action under section 17(a), 1 17 but the Supreme Court
8
reversed the decision."1
Although the Supreme Court rested its conclusion in Touche Ross
principally upon the failure of the statute to confer rights on private
parties or to proscribe any conduct as unlawful," 19 language in the majority opinion appears to embrace the principle of expressio unius. Noting that "§ 17(a) is flanked by provisions of the 1934 Act that explicitly
grant private causes of action," the Court stated that, "when Congress
wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and
did so expressly."' 120 Despite this apparent conflict, Touche Ross may
be harmonized with Con's rejection of expressio unius in the absence of
supporting legislative history.
First, in holding that the statute "grants no private rights to any
identifiable class,"' 2' the majority in Touche Ross necessarily concluded that the first Cori test was not satisfied. The failure to satisfy the
first Cor' test is, by itself, dispositive against implication. The outcome
in Touche Ross was not determined by the Court's reference to expressio unius.
Second, although both the majority 22 and concurring 23 opinions
in Touche Ross assert that the legislative history of the 1934 Act is silent
with respect to the existence of a private remedy under section 17(a),
this conclusion is dubious. It may be argued that the legislative history
of section 18(a) of the 1934 Act,' 24 which suggests that section 18(a)
was intended to establish the exclusive remedy for misstatements conthrough the medium of any such member... shall make and keep for prescribed periods
such records, furnish such copies thereof, and make and disseminate such reports as the
[Securities Exchange] Commission, by rule, prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, for the protection of investors. . . ." Id
116. 442 U.S. at 562. The plaintiffs sued on the theory that the misstatements in the
financial statements prevented the SEC from taking timely action to prevent the broker's
insolvency and the ensuing losses. Id at 565-66.
117. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978).
118. 442 U.S. at 567.
119. Id at 569.
120. Id at 571-72 (citations omitted).
121. Id at 576.
122. Id at 571.
123. Id at 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
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tained in reports filed with the SEC, demonstrated an explicit purpose
to deny a cause of action under section 17(a). 12 5 Such a purpose would
also mandate against finding an implied right of action. Thus, in
Touche Ross, the legislative history of the 1934 Act supports the presumption of exclusivity, the principle on which expressio unius rests.
As expressio unius was used in a context in which the relevant legislative history supported the inference that the express remedy was intended to be the exclusive remedy, Touche Ross may be viewed as
consistent with Cort and Cannon.
The Supreme Court's decision in Transamerica, rendered a mere
six months after Cannon, however, is more difficult to harmonize with
Cort's rejection of expressio unius. 126 This conffict exists notwithstand125. The Court noted that § 18(a) expressly created a private cause of action against
those persons, including accountants, who "make or cause to be made" materially misleading statements in reports that are filed with the SEC. 442 U.S. at 572. The Court also noted
that there was evidence in the legislative history of the 1934 Act that "§ 18(a) was intended
to provide the exclusive remedy for misstatements contained in any reports filed with the
[SEC], including those filed pursuant to § 17(a)." Id at 573-74 (footnote omitted). Implicit
in the proposition that § 18(a) was intended by Congress to be the exclusive remedy for the
filing of misleading reports with the SEC is the unarticulated, but nevertheless undeniable,
assertion that a cause of action for filing misleading statements should not be implied under
any other section of the 1934 Act, including § 17(a). Consequently, the legislative history of
the 1934 Act is not truly silent with respect to the availability of an implied remedy under
§ 17(a), notwithstanding the lack of any express reference to the existence or nonexistence of
such a remedy in the legislative history of the 1934 Act.
The implication of a private cause of action in Touche Ross also would have been inconsistent with the underlying legislative scheme. The Supreme Court observed in Touche
Ross that § 18(a) imposes liability on one who "make[s] or cause[s] to be made" materially
misleading statements in the reports filed with the SEC. Id at 572. Section 18(a) also creates an express cause of action on behalf of "any person (not knowing that such statement
was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold
a security at a price which was affected by such statements ..
" 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
In Touche Ross, the Court noted that the plaintiffs who were asserting an implied cause of
action under § 17(a) did not allege that they purchased or sold securities in reliance on the
purportedly misleading statements made by the defendants. 442 U.S. at 572-73. The Court
concluded that "where the principal express civil remedy for misstatements in reports created by Congress contemporaneously with the passage of § 17(a) is by its terms limited to
purchasers and sellers of securities, we are extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action in
§ 17(a) that is significantly broader than the remedy that Congress chose to provide." Id at
574 (citations omitted).
Congress obviously wanted to create a private right of action in favor only of persons
who purchased or sold relying on the misstatements. Implication of a cause of action under
§ 17(a) would have nullified Congress's attempt to limit potential plaintiffs to those who
relied upon the misstatements and would therefore be inconsistent with the legislative
scheme.
126. An indication of the conflict between the reasoning employed by the Transamerica
majority opinion, on one hand, and the Cori and Cannon opinions and the Transamerica
dissent, on the other hand, is illustrated by Justice Powell's position in those cases. In Cannon, in which a cause of action was implied, Justice Powell wrote a vigorous dissent con-
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ing the fact that the majority's opinion in Transamericaappears to cite
Cor' 12 7 and Cannon' 28 approvingly. In Transamerica, the plaintiff
brought a derivative action on behalf of a trust and a class action on
behalf of the shareholders of that trust. 129 The suit was predicated
upon implied causes of action under sections 206 and 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.130 The Supreme Court concluded that a
31 but that
limited cause of action could be implied under section 215,1
132
action.
of
cause
section 206 would not support an implied
The Court described the legislative history of section 206 as "entirely silent" on the issue whether a private cause of action should exist.133 The Court found several express provisions for enforcing section

206, and therefore applied expressio unius to refuse to imply a cause of
action. 134 In addition, it found "circumstantial' evidence 35 to support
the conclusion that the express remedies of the Investment Advisers
Act were intended to be exclusive.' 36 Each of the securities laws passed
prior to the Investment Advisers Act contained one or more provisions
cluding that federal courts "should not condone the implication of any private action from a
federal statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an
action to exist." 441 U.S. at 749. In Transamerica,Justice Powell not only joined the majority, but in a concurring opinion went on to state that he viewed Transamericaas compatible
with his dissent in Cannon. 444 U.S. at 25.
127. 444 U.S. at 15.
128. Id at 15-16, 18, 24. The Transamericamajority, however, also cited Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon. Id at 20.
129. Id at 13.
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6, 80b-15 (1976).
131. 444 U.S. at 18-19. Section 215 relates to the validity of contracts made by investment advisers and provides, in part: "Every contract made in violation of any provision of
this subchapter. . ., the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance
of any relationship or practice in violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule,
regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in
violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the
performance of any such contract.. . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1976). The Court concluded that the language of § 215 "fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief in a
federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of voidness ... may be litigated somewhere. At the very least Congress
must have assumed that § 215 could be raised defensively in private litigation to preclude
the enforcement of an investment advisers contract. But the legal consequences of voidness
are typically not so limited.... Mhe federal courts in general have viewed such language
as implying an equitable cause of action for rescission or similar relief." 444 U.S. at 18-19.
132. 444 U.S. at 19-25. Section 206 prohibits investment advisers from engaging in various fraudulent practices. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
133. 444 U.S. at 18.
134. Id at 19-20.
135. I at 20-22. See note 137 infa.
136. Id at 20.
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that expressly created a private right of action. 137 The Court reasoned
that the absence of such a provision under the Investment Advisers Act,
when compared with the other securities statutes that contained express
remedies, evidenced an intent to withhold a private cause of action
under that statute. 138 The analysis used in this "comparative expressio
unius" approach parallels the logic employed in conventional expressio

unius, which involves only one statute. This analysis is tenuous at
best. 139
Although the majority opinion in Transamerica reflected the views
137. Id at 20 n.10. The Court cited the following statutes: Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11,
12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77/ (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r (1976); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §§ 16(a),
17(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79p(a), 79q(b) (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 323(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77www(a) (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 30(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1976).
The Court also argued that the language of the jurisdictional section of the Investment
Advisers Act was circumstantial evidence of Congress's intent to deny a cause of action
under § 206, stating: "Early drafts of the bill had simply incorporated by reference a provision. . . which gave the federal courts jurisdiction 'of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by' the statute. . . . [T]he version finally
enacted into law. . . omitted any references to 'actions at law' or to 'liability.'" 444 U.S. at
21-22 (emphasis in original); see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976).
The dissent argued that there was no evidence that the omission of the phrase "actions
at law" was intended to preclude private suits. 444 U.S. at 31-32 (White, J., dissenting). The
majority's response indicates its recognition of the tenuous nature of its argument: "The
unexplained deletion of a single phrase from a jurisdictional provision is, of course, not
determinative of whether a private remedy exists. But it is one more piece of evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action for anything beyond limited equitable
relief." Id at 22 (footnote omitted).
138. 444 U.S. at 20-21.
139. The comparative expressio unius argument is that, when a statute is silent regarding
the availability of a private remedy, while other, related statutes expressly create private
causes of action, then the omission in the silent statute (in Transamerica, the Investment
Advisers Act) evidences an intent to exclude a private remedy under that statute. This argument may appear to have some merit, but it is not persuasive when analyzed. Consider, for
example, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976 & Supp. III
1979), one of the statutes that the Transamerica majority relied upon in making the comparative expressio unius argument. 444 U.S. at 20 n.10. Sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18 of the
1934 Act expressly create private causes of action. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r (1976).
The existence of those express remedies in the 1934 Act, together with the principle of expressio unius, have not prevented the implication of private causes of action under §§ 10(b)
and 14(a) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a) (1976); see Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-33 (1975) (implied action under § 10(b)); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (same); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-32 (1964) (implied action under § 14(a)). The existence of express
remedies in the 1934 Act therefore should not prevent the implication of a private cause of
action under the Investment Advisers Act, which is, after all, an entirely separate legislative
enactment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's use of the comparative expressio unius argument does not offer much support for the conclusion that no private cause of action should
be implied under the Investment Advisers Act.
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of only five Justices, all the Justices agreed that the first of the four Cort
factors was satisfied: "[T]he Act's legislative history leaves no doubt
that Congress intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations [on

investment advisers] because section 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on

investment advisers and confers a benefit on their clients."1 40 After

examining the second factor, the majority concluded that Congress did
not intend to create a cause of action, and therefore never reached the
third and fourth Cort factors. 41 The result in Transamerica is thus

predicated solely upon the Court's determination of legislative intent.
In support of its application of expressio unius, the Transamerica
majority cited three relatively recent cases:' 42 NationalRailroadPassenger Corp. v NationalAssociationofRailroadPassengers(Amtrak),143
T.M E., Inc. v. United States,'" and Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour.145 Analysis of these cases, however, indicates that

Transamerica'sreliance on them is misplaced. They do not support the
proposition that when the legislative history of a statute is silent the
maxim of expressio unius is sufficient, by itself, to demonstrate that the
expressed remedies are intended to be exclusive. Although in each case
the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the express remedies
147 this conclusion was
were exclusive, in Amtrak 46 and in TIME.
specifically supported by legislative history. In Barbour, on the other
hand, the Supreme Court rejected an implied cause of action princi-

pally because the Court viewed a private right to sue as inconsistent
140. 444 U.S. at 17-18; id at 27-28 (White, J., dissenting). Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens dissented in Transamerica, relying upon the reasoning of Cori and
Cannon. As it was clear that § 206 granted a class of persons certain rights, the minority,
applying Cort and Cannon, reasoned that the party asserting the implied cause of action
need not demonstrate that Congress intended to create a cause of action. The question,
rather, "is whether there is evidence of an express or implicit legislative intent to negate the
claimed private rights of action." Id at 28 (White, J., dissenting). The four-Justice minority
concluded that the second Cort factor was satisfied because there was "no such intent to
foreclose private actions." Id
141. Id at 23-25.
142. See 441 U.S. at 19-20. In addition to its reliance on the three modem cases, the
Court also cited and quoted a fourth case, Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S.
282 (1929). That case, however, did not involve an attempt to imply a cause of action.
Consequently, it offers little support for the proposition that expressio unius can be employed
to rebut the implication of a private remedy in the absence of any supporting legislative
history.
143. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
144. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
145. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
146. 414 U.S. at 458-61.
147. 359 U.S. at 470-72.
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with the underlying legislative scheme. 14 8
In Amtrak, an association of passengers attempted to enjoin the
discontinuance of certain passenger trains. The issue before the Court
was whether a private cause of action could be implied under section
307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act), which
provided for a suit "upon petition of the Attorney General of the
United States, or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition
of any employee affected thereby."' 49 Relying in part on the principle
of expressio unius, the Court concluded that section 307(a) provided the
exclusive means to enforce the duties imposed by the act, and stated
that, "when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume
' 50
other remedies."'
In the same paragraph, however, the Court limited substantially
the application of expressio unius. Noting that "even the most basic
general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary
evidence of legislative intent,"' 51 the Court proceeded to review at
length the legislative history of section 307(a). The Court discerned in
52
the history of the act an intent to preclude a private right of action,
and denied the private cause of action only after it had determined that
"the explicit legislative history of § 307(a) . . . serves to support the
same interpretation of its language that would be accorded by [expressio uniuts].' 5 3
In TLME, the issue was whether a shipper could challenge, in
postshipment litigation, the reasonableness of a charge made in accordance with the governing tariff under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,
148.

421 U.S. at 422, 424. The reasoning in Barbour, decided less than a month before

Cart, appears consistent with Cort. Barbour concludes: "As in Amtrak, a private right of

action under [the relevant statute] would be consistent neither with the legislative intent, nor
with the effectuation of the purposes it is intended to serve." Id

149. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976).
150.

414 U.S. at 458.

151.

Id. (citation omitted).

152.

The Supreme Court noted that, at the hearings in the House of Representatives on

the Amtrak Act, a proposal was made that would have permitted the institution of a private
suit by "any person adversely affected or aggrieved" by the actions of Amtrak. Id at 459.
The Secretary of Transportation, who, if the legislation were enacted, would have primary
administrative responsibility for implementing the Act, sent a letter to the appropriate subcommittee, in which he indicated his opposition to the institution of private suits by any
"aggrieved person." Id at 459-60. The Amtrak opinion indicates that "the Committee re-

drafted § 307(a) in conformity with the Secretary's recommendations" and deleted the language that would have authorized private suits by "any person adversely affected." Id at
460.
153. Id at 461.
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which constitutes Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. 154 The
Supreme Court concluded that an implied cause of action in favor of a
shipper did not exist, in part because the relevant portion of the Act,
Part II, did not contain an express remedy provision comparable to
those contained in Parts I and 111.155 The Court was careful to note,
however, that its decision also rested on both the contemporaneous and
the subsequent' 56 history of the relevant statute. The Court observed
that "[t]he structure and history of Part II. . . lead to the conclusion
that. . . Congress did not intend to give shippers a statutory cause of
"157
action for the recovery of allegedly unreasonable past rates ....
Therefore, while both Amtrak and TIME. refer to expressio
unius, their holdings are also predicated upon legislative histories demonstrating a congressional intent to exclude all private suits except
those expressly authorized. They do not, as Transamerica would suggest, provide support for the use of expressio unius as the sole basis for
denying a private cause of action in light of a legislative history that is
completely silent.
The change in Transamerica regarding expresslo unius is illustrated vividly by a comparison with the earlier decision in Cort, which
was not cited by the Transamerica Court with respect to expressio
unius. In Cort, the opponents of an implied right of action attempted
to rely upon the principle of expressio unius, arguing that, because "a
private complaint procedure" was enacted under a different section of
the statute, the omission of a private remedy in the relevant section
evidenced a congressional intent to preclude a private suit under the
latter section. Faced with a silent legislative history, 5 8 the Court rejected this contention.
[The defendants] ask us to infer from the fact that some private remedy was provided with regard to Title III of the 1971 Act an intention
to deny any such remedy with regard to the criminal statutes
amended in Title II.
We find this excursion into extrapolation of legislative intent en154. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976).
155. 414 U.S. at 470-72. Parts I and III of the Interstate Commerce Act relate to rail and
water carriers, respectively, and contain express provisions permitting a shipper to litigate
for the recovery of unlawful charges paid to carriers in the past. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 901923 (1976).
156. 414 U.S. at 471.
157. Id at 470 (emphasis added).
158. The Court stated: "T]here was, as far as the parties have been able to point out
and as far as we have been able independently to determine, no discussion whatever in
Congress concerning private enforcement of § 610." 422 U.S. at 82 n.14.
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tirely unilluminating. 159
The situations presented in Cori and Transamerica are strikingly
similar. In both, the record was devoid of legislative history to buttress
the expressio unius argument. Moreover, the defendants in both Cort
and Transamericacited precisely the same cases, Amtrak and T..E,
in support of their use of expressio unius. The Court rejected the defendants' argument in Cort because of the lack of legislative history to
support the position that the express remedy was intended to be exclusive, while the defendants in Transamerica prevailed. Thus, although
in Cort and Transamericathe Supreme Court was presented with the
same argument, supported by the same judicial authorities, the Court
reached opposite conclusions. Furthermore, the Transamericamajority
failed to recognize any inconsistency between its position and the deci160
sion in Cort, and appeared to cite Cort approvingly in other contexts.
Unlike Amtrak and TZM~fE, the third case relied on by the Tran6
samerica Court, Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,11 involved a truly silent legislative history, that of the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA). 162 SIPA established the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) as a nonprofit, private membership corporation to which most registered broker-dealers are required
to belong.1 63 In Barbour, a customer of a broker-dealer member
brought suit against the SIPC, based upon an implied cause of action,
requesting an order directing the SIPC to discharge its functions under
SIPA with respect to the broker-dealer.1 6 The Supreme Court con159.
160.
161.
162.

Id
See 444 U.S. at 15.
421 U.S. 412 (1975).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).

163. Id. § 78ccc(a)(1-(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
164.

SIPA was amended in 1978 by the Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments

of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-283, 92 Stat. 249 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78aaa-78111 (Supp. III 1979)). The modifications contained in these amendments are not
material for the purposes of analyzing Barbour'suse of expressio unius. Under SIPA provisions in force at the time Barbour was decided, if the SIPC determined that a member firm
had failed or was in danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers, and the SIPC
concluded that one of five specified conditions suggestive of financial irresponsibility was
present, then it could "apply to any court of competent jurisdiction ... for a decree adjudicating that customers of such member are in need of the protection provided by [SIPA]."
421 U.S. at 416. The mere filing of the application by the SIPC gave the court exclusive

jurisdiction over the member firm and its property wherever located. If the court found any
of the five conditions that suggest financial irresponsibility, then the court was obligated to
grant the application and appoint as a trustee for the liquidation of the business such persons as the SIPC specified. Id at 416-17. SIPA gave the SEC the power to apply to the

appropriate district court for an order requiring the SIPC to discharge its obligations under
SIPA. Id at 417-18.
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cluded that a customer could not maintain such an action based upon
165
an implied cause of action under SIPA.
Although the Barbour Court referred to expressio unius, reliance
on this decision by the TransamericaCourt is unjustified. Barbour referred to that principle in the context of the Amtrak decision, observing
that in Amtrak "[i]nspection revealed that the legislative history of the
Amtrak Act was entirely consonant with the implication of the statutory language that no private right of action was intended."' 166 As Amtrak involved a legislative history demonstrating a congressional intent
to exclude private suits that are not expressly authorized, it does not
support the Transamerica Court's conclusion.1 67
Additionally, the actual holding in Barbour is based upon the failure to satisfy the third Cort factor--that the implication of a cause of
action under SIPA must be consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme. 68 Cort and the three cases cited in Transamerica evidence a reluctance on the part of the Court to rely upon the
principle of expresslo unius in the absence of supporting legislative history. This reluctance may have its origins in the Court's recognition of
the ambiguous nature of silence. According to the reasoning employed
under expressio unius, when Congress has provided at least one remedy
for the violation of a duty, Congress's silence with respect to other remedies is intentional; this silence demonstrates an intent to preclude the
availability of all other remedies.
As a practical matter, however, silence is ambiguous. Even the
Rogers court, which attributed great significance to silence, recognized
its ambiguous nature. 169 Silence might indicate that Congress thought
165. 421 U.S. at 418-25.
166. Id at 419 (footnote omitted).
167. See notes 149-53 & accompanying text supra.
168. Barbour is one of three cases cited in Con as illustrative of the relevance of the
third factor. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78. The Barbour Court feared that permitting
customers an implied cause of action might precipitate unnecessary liquidations, contrary to
Congress's purpose in enacting SIPA. "The SIPC's policy, therefore, is to defer intervention
'until there appear[s] to be no reasonable doubt that customers would need the protection of
the Act.'. . . A customer, by contrast, cannot be expected to consider, or have adequate
information to consider, these public interests in timing his decision to apply to the courts."
421 U.S. at 422 (citation omitted). The possibility of such liquidations led the Court to
conclude that implication of a cause of action in favor of a customer of a registered brokerdealer would be "too inimical to the purposes of the Act," id at 423, and it accordingly
refused to permit such suits.
169. "Where there is silence, as Cannon commands, we seek for affirmative evidence of
Congressional intent. Silence may indicate only that the question never occurred to Congress at all, or it may reflect mere oversight in failing to deal with a matter intended to be
covered, or it may demonstrate deliberate obscurity to avoid controversy that might defeat
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that it had spoken with sufficient clarity, so that the courts would understand that private enforcement was intended. As the doctrine of expressio unius presumes, however, silence may evidence an intent by
Congress to preclude the availability of other remedies. Arguably, in
light of this ambiguity, the Court has viewed as especially important
the need for additional indications of legislative intent when expressio
unius is invoked.
Implicit in Transamericais the suggestion that expressio unius may
be invoked to defeat the implication of a cause of action without the
necessity of finding support for the exclusivity of the express remedy in
the legislative history. The Transamerica majority indicated its intent
to take a more restrictive approach concerning the implication of private causes of action than it had in earlier cases. Citing its 1964 decision in J Case Co. v. Borak,170 the majority in Transamerica noted
that the Court's earlier decisions had "placed considerable emphasis"
on implying causes of action "to effectuate the purposes of a given statute,"'17 1 but that more recent decisions had emphasized determining
72
whether "Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted."'1
The Court did not have to return to the 1960's to find the application of
its approach in Borak. In Cannon, decided only six months before
Transamerica,the Court had stressed the need to imply private remedies to effectuate congressional policies: "[W]hen that remedy [implication of private causes of action] is necessary or at least helpful to the
accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly recep' 173
tive to its implication under the statute."
This pronounced change in the attitude of the Supreme Court towards implication within such a brief period suggests that any prediction concerning the standards to be used in future implication cases,
including those involving section 503, should be made with caution.
Reconciling Transamerica with Cort and Cannon
Under Transamerica, after the party opposing implication establishes that the statute in question does provide an express remedy, expressio unius may be invoked without citing any legislative history that
the passage of legislation, or it may, indeed, be a result merely of an assumption by Congress
that the courts would recognize a private cause of action." 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
170. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
171. 444 U.S. at 15.
172. Id. at 15-16.
173. 441 U.S. at 703 (footnote omitted).

July 19821

PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION

supports the presumption of exclusivity.1 74 The burden of proof then
shifts to the proponent of implication to produce "persuasive evidence"
of legislative intent.' 75 The proponent of implication faces a formidable
obstacle in attempting to rebut the presumption of exclusivity created
by expressio unius, because of the likelihood that the legislative history
the statute itself is silent concerning the private remwill be silent when
76
edy asserted.'
The minority opinion in Transamerica, however, relied on Cort
and Cannon to develop a different presumption. The minority stated
that the second Cort factor involved an inquiry into "whether there
is evidence of an express or implicit legislative intent to negate the
claimed private rights of action." 177 In effect, the Transamericaminority viewed Cort and Cannon as creating a rebuttable presumption of an
intention on the part of Congress to create a cause of action, once it has
been established that there is a clear grant of a federal right to an identifiable class. If the party opposing implication is to prevail with respect to the second Cori factor, that party would have to demonstrate a
congressional intent to deny a private remedy. As the legislative history of the relevant statute will probably be silent or ambiguous on this
issue, however, it will be difficult for that party to rebut the presumption in favor of implication.
In view of this probable silence, the allocation of the burden of
proof is critical in implication cases. The party bearing the burden of
proof with respect to the second Cort factor probably will encounter
difficulty in sustaining it. The question of which party bears the burden depends on which of the two competing presumptions is applied.
The presumption used by the Transamerica majority will make it difficult to demonstrate a congressional intent to create a cause of action.
Therefore, that approach could significantly reduce the number of situations in which a private remedy will be implied. The presumption
contemplated by Cort, Cannon, and the Transamericaminority, on the

other hand, would force the party opposing implication to demonstrate
a congressional intent to deny a private remedy. The practical effect of
this presumption would be to permit the second Cort factor to be satisfied in many situations in which the Transamerica majority's opinion
174. Cf.Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1979) (expressio unius
applied when legislative history showed Congress intended exclusive remedy). See notes
122-25 & accompanying text supra.
175. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979).
176. See notes 108-09 & accompanying text supra.
177. 444 U.S. at 28 (White, J., dissenting); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. at 694; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82.
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would require the opposite conclusion. Thus, the conflict between
Transamerica and the Cort-Cannon approach has significant practical
consequences.
There are at least three possible explanations for the Court's apparent abrupt shift in Transamerica. First, it may be possible to reconcile Cannon's receptivity to the implication of private causes of action
with Transamerica'smore restrictive approach on the ground that Cannon involved the alleged violation of the plaintiffs civil rights. Commentators have asserted that the Supreme Court in fact, even if not in
theory, is more liberal in implying private rights of action under civil
rights statutes than under other types of statutes. 178 Two of these commentators have argued that the apparently divergent results in Cannon
and Transamerica substantiate their position. 7 9 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has made statements that suggest that it is more likely
to imply a cause of action in civil rights cases than in non-civil rights
cases. In Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez,18 0 the Court stated that "we
have frequently recognized the propriety of inferring a federal cause of
action for the enforcement of civil rights, even when Congress has spoken in purely declarative terms."' 18 1 This statement was cited one year
18 2
later in Cannon.
Section 503, like other statutes prohibiting employment discrimination, is a civil rights statute.' 83 If the preceding analysis is correct,
then the Supreme Court may use a less restrictive approach to implication of a private cause of action under section 503 than it has in its
other recent implication decisions. The Court might, for example, im178. Implied Rights of Action, supra note 8,at 1230; Note, Implied Rights ofAction to
Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378-80 (1978);
Wermiel, Supreme Court ProtectsAdvisers on Damage Suits, Wall St. J.,Nov. 14, 1979, at 4,
col. 1.
179. ImpliedRights ofAclion, supra note 8,at 1240-41; Wermiel, Supreme Court Protects
Advisers on Damage Suits, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
180. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).

181.

Id at 61.

182.

441 U.S. at 691 n.13. It is possible to view Cannon and Transamericaas consistent

with respect to the implication of a private remedy because the former was a civil rights case
while the latter was not. Because neither Cort nor Transamerica was a civil rights case,
however, they cannot be reconciled on this ground.
183. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
In addition, Congress has treated Title V of the Rehabilitation Act as a civil rights
statute. For example, during the Senate's debate on the adoption of the 1978 amendments,
Senator Cranston affirmed his "interest in and involvement with assisting handicapped individuals in this civil rights struggle." 124 CONG. REC. 30,346 (1978). Senator Cranston also
compared the attorneys' fees provision of the Senate bill with the Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fee Awards Act of 1976. Id

July 1982)

PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION

ply a private remedy under section 503 notwithstanding the lack of any
contemporaneous legislative history supporting implication and the
new expressio unius analysis it employed in Transamerica. This conclusion, however, is little more than speculation.

A plaintiff seeking the implication of a private cause of action
under a civil rights statute must still demonstrate that all four Cort tests
are satisfied. Although Cannon involved a civil rights statute, the

Court's conclusion that implication of a private remedy was proper
was based on an extensive analysis of all four Cort factors.18 4 Therefore, the simple assertion that section 503 is a civil rights statute is not

enough to avoid the four-part Cort test. In addition, even if the
Supreme Court has been more willing to imply a cause of action in civil
rights contexts
in the past, it may become more restrictive in the
5
future.

18

Second, because of the tenuous reasoning of the narrow majority

in Transamerica,it is possible to view Transamerica not as a dramatic
change but as an aberration that future courts will ignore or distinguish. If Transamericais an aberration, then the Court might revert to
its pre-Transamericaapproach, under which it would not apply express/o unius in the absence of supporting legislative history. As no rele-

vant contemporaneous legislative history of section 503 exists, the
maxim of expressio unius could not be invoked. Therefore, the defend-

ant would be unable to demonstrate a legislative intent to deny a cause
184. See 441 U.S. at 689-709. See generally ImpliedRights af4ction, supra note 8. The
commentator asserts that the Supreme Court is more likely to find an implied cause of action when dealing with a civil rights statute than with "economic-regulatory statutes," and
that "continued judicial reliance upon expressions of congressional intent promises continued confusion. Judicial construction of the Rehabilitation Act demonstrates that when legislative intent is ambiguous, resort to Cort or any other test centered upon legislative intent
produces ambiguous results." Id at 1254. Because of these ambiguous results, the commentator argues that the courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that Congress intended a
private cause of action to exist under all civil rights statutes. Id at 1254-60. Implicit in this
argument is a rejection of the Cari test, at least with respect to civil right statutes.
The differing conclusions reached by various courts in applying the Cort tests to § 503
demonstrate the lack of certainty inherent in the use of Cori. See notes 7-8 & accompanying
text supra. Notwithstanding the imprecise results produced by reliance on Cort, there appears no indication that the Supreme Court is prepared to abandon Cart. In fact, as previously indicated, Cannon has been widely perceived as reaffirming the continuing vitality of
the Cort approach. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the merits of whether there
should be a special presumption with respect to the implication of causes of action under
civil rights statutes.
185. Even the Cannon opinion reflects the Supreme Court's increasing displeasure with
the number of implication cases in the federal courts. See 441 U.S. at 717 ("When Congress
intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far
better course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights.").

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

of action. If Transamerica is merely an aberration and the CortCannon approach remains viable, then the implication of a cause of
action under section 503 would be appropriate.
This explanation, however, is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court's
continued affirmations of a restrictive approach cannot be ignored. In
Touche Ross, for example, the unsuccessful plaintiff sought to invoke
the Court's decision in J. Case Co. v. Borak18 6 in support of his attempted implied cause of action. The Supreme Court responded:
To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the
Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak
we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private
causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard today.1 s7
This pronouncement suggests that Transamerica is not an aberration.
Finally, the third explanation of the Supreme Court's seemingly
inconsistent approaches in Cort-Cannon and Transamerica is that
Transamerica does overrule Cori and Cannon. Accordingly,
Transamerica may be the harbinger of an even more restrictive approach to implication. To assess the ramifications of such an approach,
it is necessary to examine the policy considerations that may underlie
the Court's shift.
The Supreme Court has indicated the policy considerations that
militate in favor of implication.1 8 It is more difficult, however, to
identify the policy considerations that have caused the Supreme Court
to refuse to imply private rights of action. The Court typically couches
its refusal in terms of the failure to satisfy one or more of the Cori
factors. The most coherent explanation of a very restrictive approach
towards implication is found in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in
Cannon.
Justice Powell advanced two principal arguments. First, he noted
that since the Supreme Court's decision in Cori "no less than 20 decisions by the Courts of Appeals have implied private actions from federal statutes."' 8 9 Thus, Justice Powell is suggesting that the Cort
0 Other members of the
approach opens the "floodgates" of litigation. 19
Court have also indicated their growing impatience with the number of
implied cause of action cases that the Court must consider.' 9'
186.

377 U.S. 426 (1964).

187.

442 U.S. at 578.

188. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 703; Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33.
189. 441 U.S. at 741 (Powell, J., dissenting).
190. The "floodgates" argument is discussed at notes 339-44 & accompanying text infra.
191. See notes 341-43 & accompanying text infra.
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Second, Justice Powell stated that the implication of a private remedy in Cannon and other cases violated the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.1 92 Justice Powell's analysis led to the conclusion
that the four-factor Cort approach should be abandoned:
In sum, I believe the need both to restrain courts that too readily
have created private causes of action, and to encourage Congress to
confront its obligation to resolve crucial policy questions created by
the legislation it enacts, has become compelling. Because the analysis suggested by Cort has proven inadequate to meet these problems,
I would start afresh. Henceforth, we should not condone the implication of any private action from a federal statute absent the most
compelling
evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to
19 3
exist.

Justice Powell's approach to implication is the most restrictive.
None of the other Justices agreed that Cort should be abandoned.
Even if Transamericais inconsistent with Cort and Cannon, it does not
require a total rejection of their approach. At most, Transamerica alters the Cort-Cannon approach by emphasizing the importance of legislative intent, the second Cort factor, and by placing the burden of proof
of that intent upon the proponent of the implied-cause of action.
In summary, the rationale behind the Court's apparently conflicting positions in Cort, Cannon, and Transamericais not clear at present,
although it is apparent that the Court's recent decisions have placed
increased emphasis on the second Cort factor. If either of the first two
explanations is correct, then Transamerica is not an insurmountable
obstacle to the implication of a private right of action under section
503. If the third explanation is correct, however, then the party asserting an implied cause of action would have to sustain the heavy burden
192. "The 'four factor' analysis of [Cori] is an open invitation to federal courts to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an analysis not faithful to constitutional principles and should be rejected. Absent the most compelling evidence of affirmative
congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action." 441 U.S. at
731 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell concluded that "the Cort analysis too easily may
be used to deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court instead to
substitute its own views as to the desirability of private enforcement." Id at 740. The constitutional issue raised by Justice Powell need not be resolved for the purpose of determining
whether a private right of action exists under § 503. The attorneys' fees provision of the
1978 amendments, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. III 1979), demonstrates that Congress deems
private enforcement of § 503 to be desirable. See notes 226-65 & accompanying text infra.
Thus, the implication of a cause of action under § 503 does not require a court to "substitute
its own views as to the desirability of private enforcement." As Judge Goldberg, dissenting
in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980),
stated, "Courts are guilty of judicial legislation not only when they do that which Congress
has not authorized, but also when they refuse to give effect to the congressional purpose."
Id at 1089.
193. 421 U.S. at 749.
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of demonstrating that Congress intended to create a private remedy. If
consideration is limited to the contemporaneous legislative history of
the relevant statute, then a private cause of action cannot be implied
under section 503, because there is no contemporaneous legislative history regarding the availability of a private remedy. On the other hand,
if subsequent legislative history may be used to discern Congress's
intent at the time of the original enactment,, then the history of subsequent legislation under the Rehabilitation Act demonstrates a
congressional intent that private causes of action be permitted.
Subsequent Legislative History: The 1974 and 1978 Amendments
The preceding section of this Article assumed, arguendo, that the
1974 and 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act could not be used
to ascertain whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action under section 503. This section analyzes that assumption and concludes that it is untenable. Although the 1974 amendments do not
reflect such an intent, the 1978 amendments and their legislative history
provide cogent support for the proposition that Congress intended to
create a private remedy under section 503.
Propriety of Reliance on Subsequent Legislative History
The threshold question is whether the legislative history of a statute subsequent to its enactment can be used as a guide in the construction of the original statute. The Supreme Court has answered in the
affirmative, although in effect both the Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. FritoLay, Inc. 194 and the Seventh Circuit in Simpson v. Reynolds Metal
Co. 195 have reached a contrary conclusion in interpreting section
503.196

Outside the context of section 503, the Supreme Court has recognized the utility of subsequent legislative history in interpreting statutes. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 19 7 for example, the
Supreme Court observed that "[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the
intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction."g19 The continuing vitality of this principle was reaffirmed in
194.
195.

611 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
629 F.2d 1226, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1980).

196. Although the Second and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a cause of action
could not be implied under § 503, both courts considered it appropriate to examine the 1978
amendments in discerning Congress's intent. See Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861,
866 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United Air Lines, 662 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1981).
197. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

198.

Id at 380-81 (footnotes omitted).
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Cannon, in which the Court considered the use of the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976199 to interpret
section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.200 The
Court concluded that subsequent history should be considered:
Although we cannot accord these remarks [made during consideration of the 1976 legislation] the weight of contemporary legislative
history, we would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX and its place
within "the civil rights enforcement scheme"201that successive Congresses have created over the past 110 years.
Thus, Cannon suggests that a court not merely may, but must consider
subsequent legislative history. Despite Cannon, both Simpson and
Rogers paid little attention to the subsequent legislative history of section 503. In Simpson, the Seventh Circuit misconstrued Cannon as rejecting the use of subsequent legislative history. 20 2 Similarly, the
Rogers court quoted Cannon only to limit the weight to be accorded
subsequent legislative history. Rogers failed to repeat or heed Cannon's mandate to examine subsequent statements that Cannon characterized as "authoritative expressions" of legislative intent. 20 3 Thus, the
Rogers court inaccurately perceived the thrust of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Cannon.204
The use of subsequent legislative history, however, has limitations.
First, as the Court noted in Cannon, greater deference is to be accorded
to contemporaneous legislative history than to subsequent legislative
history.205 Second, Supreme Court decisions suggest that the value of
199. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) to authorize courts in Title IX suits to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party).
200. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
201. 441 U.S. at 686 n.7.
202. "[A]s the Supreme Court noted in rejecting an almost identical argument in Cannon
v. University of Chicago premised upon Congress' adoption of an attorney's fee provision
four years subsequent to its adoption of Title IX, 'we would be remiss if we ignored these
authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose' of the Title, but 'we cannot
accord these remarks the weight of contemporary legislative history."' 629 F.2d at 1242-43.
Such a phrasing implies that the Cannon Court did not consider subsequent history, an
implication that is false.
203. "The Cannon Court noted, despite its partial reliance on later legislative history,
that 'we cannot accord these remarks the weight of contemporary legislative history ..
611 F.2d at 1080 n.6.
204. The Rogers court's discussion of Cannon implies that the significance of subsequent
legislative history is rather limited. In Cannon, however, the Supreme Court noted that a
court would be "remiss" if it did not at least consider subsequent history. 441 U.S. at 686
n.7. Furthermore, the Court described those subsequent statements as "authoritative expressions" of congressional intent, implying that such history could be used as persuasive evidence in statutory construction. Id
205. "Id
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subsequent legislative history depends, to a significant extent, on the
time interval between the two enactments. The four-year time interval
in Cannon did not preclude examination of subsequent history. In SEC
v. Capital Gains Bureau,20 6 however, the Court refused to consider legislative history twenty years subsequent to the original act. 20 7 Thus, a
brief time interval between amendments and the act should not preclude the use of subsequent legislative history.
In light of Red Lion and Cannon, a court must consider the subsequent legislative history of a statute, when appropriate, in construing
an earlier act. Furthermore, the recognized limitations on the use of
subsequent legislative history should not be obstacles to the use of
either the 1974 or the 1978 amendments in discerning Congress's intent
with respect to section 503. Thus, the assumption that the amendments
cannot be employed in interpreting section 503 and the resulting conclusion that section 503 must be construed in the context of a silent
legislative history are both invalid.
The 1974 Amendments
In more than half of the reported section 503 cases, the plaintiffs
have contended that the Senate Labor and Welfare Committee Report
on the 1974 amendments demonstrates a congressional intent to permit
private enforcement of section 503. Although two courts have accepted
this argument, 20 8 the majority have not. 209 The majority view appears
210
correct.
In its report on the 1974 amendments, the Senate Labor and Wel206. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
207. The respondent contended that the 1960 amendments to the Investment Advisers
Act reflected Congress's intention in 1940, when the original act was adopted. Id at 199.
Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court indicated that "[olpinions attributed to a Congress twenty years after the event cannot be considered evidence of the intent of the Congress of 1940." Id at 199-200.
208. California Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (C.D. Cal.
1980); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 73 (N.D. Cal. 1979). The dissenting
judge in Rogers also accepted this argument. 611 F.2d at 1095-96 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
209. Eg., Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United
Air Lines, 662 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d at
1241; Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1081; Langman v. Western Elec. Co., 488 F.
Supp. 680, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
210. Curiously, none of the decisions involving § 503 have addressed the issue whether
the 1974 amendments, as subsequent legislative history, may permissibly be consulted to
discover the intent of Congress. This apparent anomaly perhaps may be explained by the
fact that the 1974 amendments were enacted by the Second Session of the same Congress
that enacted the Rehabilitation Act a year earlier. The original Rehabilitation Act was
passed by the First Session of the 93d Congress as Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
The 1974 amendments were passed by the Second Session of the 93d Congress as Pub. L.
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fare Committee referred to twenty-three specific amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act, 2 11 including changes in the methods of implementing section 504,212 which prohibits discrimination against qualified
handicapped individuals in programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance. 21 3 The report stated:
This approach to implementation of section 504, which closely follows the models [of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972] would... permit ajudicialremedy through a private action.

It is intended that sections 503 and 504 be administered in such
a manner that a consistent, unform, and effective Federalapproach to

discrimination against handicapped persons would result. Thus,
Federal agencies and departments should cooperate in developing
standards and policies so that
2 14 there is a uniform, consistent Federal
approach to these sections.
The Committee's statement expressly contemplates the existence of a

private cause of action under section 504. Advocates of a private right
of action under section 503 argue that the Committee's desire for a uniform federal approach indicates that Congress also must have intended
to create a private cause of action under section 503.215
This argument cannot withstand close scrutiny. First, the substan-

tial differences between the language of section 504 and of section
503216 suggest that different enforcement mechanisms might be suitable. The language of section 504 was modeled after, and is almost
identical to, the language of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VI) 21 7 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title
IX); 2 1s therefore, it seems appropriate that section 504 be enforced in
No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). Although no case has done so explicitly, perhaps the courts
have considered the 1974 amendments to be contemporaneous legislative history.
211. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25, repntedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEws 6373, 6374-76.
212. Id at 38-40, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 6388-91.
213. Section 504 provides, in part, that "[no otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ......
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979).
214. S. RaP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6373, 6391 (emphasis added).
215. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1095-96 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
216. The relevant language of§ 503 is quoted in note 3 supra. The relevant language of
§ 504 is quoted in note 213 supra.
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
218. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
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the same manner as Titles VI and IX.219
The language of section 503, on the other hand, bears no relationship to the language of section 504 and of Titles VI and IX. Furthermore, other than the fact that sections 503 and 504 share the common
goal of ameliorating the conditions faced by handicapped individuals,
their functions differ. Although some individuals and firms may be
subject to the strictures of both sections 503 and 504, the sections apply
to separate and distinct groups. Section 503 imposes obligations on
federal contractors who sell goods or services to the federal government, while section 504 binds those who accept grants or gifts from the
federal government to support programs or activities that the federal
government deems desirable. Section 503 involves affirmative action
employment obligations of federal contractors, while section 504 involves discriminatory practices in programs or activities receiving
federal financial assistance. As both the language and function of sections 503 and 504 differ substantially, it is certainly possible that Congress intended the modes of enforcement under those sections to differ.
Second, the Committee's stated intent "that sections 503 and 504
be administered in such a manner that a consistent, uniform, and effective Federal approach . . .would result" 220 is not entirely clear. On
one hand, it may suggest that the enforcement procedures under these
sections must be identical. On the other, it may imply that the procedures, although different, should not conflict and thereby impair the
efficacy of either section.
The adjectives "consistent," "uniform," and "effective" have been
judicially interpreted in the disjunctive and treated as separate and distinct goals. 22 1 For example, one court has found "uniformity" to be a
separate aim: "In light of the rather express congressional intent that a
private remedy be available to enforce Section 504, the emphasis on
uniformity suggests that Congress contemplated the same scheme with
respect to Section 503."' 222 Although this argument cannot be definitively rejected, it is not persuasive. The derivation, language, and function of sections 503 and 504 differ substantially, and it is difficult to
discern from the entire scheme of these sections a congressional "em219. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6390.

220. Id at 40, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6391.
221. Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979); see California Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125 (C.D. Cal. 1980).

222.

485 F. Supp. at 73. In Hart, the court also discussed the adjective "effective" as a

separate goal. Id at 73-74. Another district court accepted the arguments in Hart. See

California Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. at 129-30.
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phasis on uniformity" that would compel implication of a cause of action under section 503.
Moreover, if the Committee's statement is interpreted to intend
only a single goal, an "effective federal approach" against discrimination, different enforcement mechanisms might be appropriate. Under
this interpretation, the Committee might have included the adjectives
"consistent" and "uniform" because of its concern that "inconsistent"
or "nonuniform" administration of sections 503 and 504 might impair
the efficacy of the government's attack on discrimination against the
handicapped.
Other statements in the report support this view. For example, the
Committee stated that "[t]he Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. .. should assume responsibility for coordinating the section 504 enforcement effort and for establishing a coordinating mechanism with the Secretary of the Department of Labor to
ensure a consistent approach to the implementation of sections 503 and
504."m Although different procedures may be coordinated and viewed
as consistent, conflicting procedures may not. Thus, as the court reasoned in Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Railway,224 the references to
"coordination" and "consistency" express the Committee's apprehension that the adoption of conflicting policies would undermine the effectiveness of the statute. Rejecting the implication of a private cause
of action, the Anderson court stated that, "when Congress stated that
sections 503 and 504 were to be 'consistent' and 'uniform,' Congress
meant that the two responsible agencies were not to work at cross purposes or to duplicate each other's efforts, not that identical methods of
''22 enforcement were envisioned.
In conclusion, the Senate Committee's statement imports only that
a private cause of action under section 503 should be implied if the
absence of such a remedy would actually conflict with the policies of,
and thus impair the goals and effect of, section 504. The function and
focus of the two sections are distinct, and the refusal to imply a cause of
action under section 503 should have little effect on the implementation
of section 504. Thus, the legislative history of the 1974 amendments
does not clearly identify a congressional intent to imply a private cause
of action under section 503.
223.

S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws 6373, 6391.
224. 468 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Ohio 1979).
225. Id at 939.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

The 1978 Amendments

Unlike the 1974 amendments, the 1978 amendments and their legislative history forcefully support the conclusion that a private cause of
action should be implied under section 503. The Committee Reports in
both houses of Congress in 1978 demonstrate Congress's understanding
that in 1973 it had created a private remedy for violations of section
503. Section 505(b) of the 1978 amendments permits courts to grant
attorneys' fees in suits brought under Title V of the Rehabilitation
Act. 226 The legislative history of this provision reveals that Congress
intended by this amendment not simply to allow, but even to encourage, private suits by handicapped victims of discrimination.
The House Committee on Education and Labor reported favorably on the House bill, which included a provision for attorneys' fees
similar to that included in section 505(b) as finally enacted. The Committee noted that this section would permit courts to award attorneys'
fees to prevailing parties other than the United States "in any action or
proceeding to enforce [section 503]."227 In contrast, the Senate Report,
by the Committee on Human Resources, indicates with even greater
clarity that section 505(b) was intended to facilitate the enforcement of
section 503 through private rights of action.
The committee believes that the rights extended to handicapped individuals under title V [which include] employment under Federal
contracts.

. .

are, and will remain, in need of constant vigilance by

handicapped individuals to assure compliance, and the availability
of attorney's fees should assist in vindicating private rights of action
in the case of section 502 and 503 cases, as well as those arising under
section 501 and 504.228
Moreover, private enforcement was viewed as an effective means
of implementation, and some legislators hoped that the availability of
attorneys' fees would instigate appropriate private action. In the course
of debate, Senator Cranston linked the necessity of private enforcement
with the need to protect the right to employment under federal con1979). See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
226. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. 1II
227. H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7312, 7332. The Committee stated: "Section. . .503 relates to affirmative action
in employment of the handicapped by certain Federal contractors . .

.

. The proposed

amendment is not in any way unique. At present there are at least 90 separate attorneys
fees provisions to promote enforcement of over 90 different Federal laws. In fact, disabled
individuals are one of the very few minority groups in this country who have not been
authorized by the Congress to seek attorneys' fees. The amendment proposes to correct this
omission and thereby assist handicapped individuals in securing the legal protection guaranteed them under title V of the act." Id

228.

S.REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978).
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tracts. 229 He went on to state: "To date, we have permitted certain
private enforcement of title V and, yet, we have not provided the means
by which such private rights of action are meaningful. This amendment-providing attorneys' fees. . . will go a long way toward assisting ...handicapped individuals [to vindicate their rights]. ' 230 He also
noted that "[an important reason for the inclusion of the attorneys'

fees provision in S. 2600 is to encourage appropriate private litigants to
bring actions under title V of the Rehabilitation Act." 23 1 If there were

any opponents to private enforcement of section 503, Senator Cranston's remarks should have elicited that opposition.
No opposition to Senator Cranston's remarks or to the Committee's report regarding private enforcement was voiced. Moreover, the
Senator's statement elicited the response that it was "the continuing
intention of Congress that private actions be allowed under. . . title V
[including section 5031. ' ' 232 Thus, it was unambiguously asserted that a

private right of action existed under section 503 prior to the 1978
23 4
amendments, 23 3 and his assertion went unchallenged.
Further support for the conclusion that the 1978 amendments

demonstrate Congress's understanding that it had implicitly created a
cause of action under section 503 in 1973 comes from an examination
of the membership of Congress in 1973 and 1978. In 1978, 341 of the
legislators in office in 1973 remained in one of the Houses of Con-

gress. 235 Not even one of these 341 legislators manifested opposition at
any time to the reports of the relevant committees that clearly contem-

plated the existence of a private cause of action under section 503. In229. 124 CONG. REc. 30,346 (1978).
230. Id at 30,347.
231. Id at 30,349 (emphasis added).
232. 124 CONG. REc. 30,349 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
233. Although Senator Cranston's encouragement of private suits was directed to suits
brought under Title V as a whole, his earlier comments nevertheless specifically included the
right to employment under federal contracts as a Title V right, requiring private vigilance.
See note 229 & accompanying text supra.
234. Senator Cranston's remarks are entitled to some deference; he was the floor manager of the Rehabilitation Act'and the 1974 Amendments and the author of the attorneys'
fees provision of the 1978 amendments. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1098
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
235. In 1978, there were 267 Representatives who had been Representatives in 1973.
See 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 93d Cong., 3381-86 (1973-74); 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 95th
Cong., 25,501-06 (1977-78). In addition, there were 68 Senators in 1978 who had been Senators in 1973. See I CONG. INDEX (CCH) 93d Cong., 1899-1900 (1973-74); 1 CONG. INDEX
(CCH) 95th Cong., 11, 501-02 (1977-78). Finally, there were six Senators in 1978 who had
been Representatives in 1973. See 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 93d Cong., 3381-86 (1973-74); 1
CONG. INDEX (CCH) 95th Cong., 11,501-02 (1977-78).
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deed, none of the thirteen legislators who voted against the 1978
amendments objected to their enactment on the ground that a cause of
action did not exist under section 503 or that it was not created in 1973.
Furthermore, no objection was raised on the floor of the Senate, even
to comments that Congress had previously created a private right of
action under section 503, and that the provision for attorneys' fees was
intended to "encourage" private lawsuits by handicapped individuals.
Given these multiple indications in 1978 that Congress had created a cause of action in 1973, the failure of even one of the 341 members of Congress in both years to object is significant. This silence
could be explained, at least theoretically, on the ground that all of the
341 legislators involved had a faulty recollection of their own intent in
1973 or that they had changed their position in the interim. It is submitted, however, that with so large a number of legislators involved it is
improbable that all of them suffered a lapse of memory or a change of
opinion. It seems more probable that no objection was raised to the
statements made in 1978 because those statements accurately reflected
Congress's intent in 1973.
The relevance of Congress's perception in 1978 that a private
cause of action already existed under section 503 was underscored by
the Supreme Court's very recent opinion in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran.236 In that opinion, which was rendered in
May 1982, the Supreme Court found an implied cause of action under
the Commodity Exchange Act. 237 In the process of discerning legislative intent, the Supreme Court expressly sanctioned reliance upon
2 38
"Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping."
236.

102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).

237. Id at 1839-41. The predecessor of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) was enacted in 1922, and major amendments to that statute were made in 1936, 1974, and 1978. Id
at 1827 n.1.
238. Id at 1839. The Court also stated that "[tihe key to this case is our understanding
of the intent of Congress in 1974 when it comprehensively reexamined and strengthened the
federal regulation of futures trading." Id
In Curran, the Court noted that "[pIrior to the comprehensive amendments to the CEA
enacted in 1974, the federal courts routinely and consistently had recognized an implied
... Id The Supreme
private cause of action. . . for violation of provisions of the CEA.
Court maintained that Congress must have been aware of this case law, which it described
as part of the "contemporary legal context." Id It rested this position, in part, on a quotation from the majority opinion in Cannon: "[I]t is always appropriate to assume that our
elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law." Id (citation omitted). Finally,
the Curran majority concluded: "In that context [that a cause of action had been implied
under the CEA prior to 1974], the fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant
amendment [in 1974] of the CEA left intact the statutory provisions under which the federal
courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to
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If Congress did not believe it had created a private right of action

in 1973, then its inclusion of the attorneys' fees provision in the 1978
amendments was a meaningless and futile gesture. Such an interpreta-

tion would conflict with the venerable rule of statutory construction
that statutes should not be interpreted as meaningless when another
interpretation is possible. 23 9 Thus, by adopting the 1978 amendments,

Congress manifested by conduct its belief that it had created a private
remedy in 1973.
Cannon v. University of Chicago presented an analogous situation.24° In both Title IX and section 503, a federal statute conferred a

federal right on a particular class, but in each case the relevant statute
was silent on the availability of a private remedy. Furthermore, in both
preserve that remedy." Id at 1841 (footnote omitted). In effect, the majority argued in
Curran that Congress "perceived" a cause of action as existing prior to the 1974 amendments and that Congress's expectation that this cause of action would continue to be available should not be defeated.
An analogous argument can be advanced with respect to section 503. At the time that
the 1978 amendments were being considered and adopted, no court of appeals had decided a
case involving an attempt to imply a cause of action under that statute. See note 7 supra.
Several district courts had, however, decided section 503 cases at that time, but they had
reached differing conclusions. See note 8 supra. Nevertheless, as the relevant committee
reports, congressional debate, and the enactment of section 505(b) make abundntly clear,
Congress certainly perceived that a cause of action existed under section 503 in 1978. See
notes 226-37 & accompanying text supra. As Curran teaches, that perception should be
considered in discerning legislative intent, and courts should be reluctant to defeat Congress's expectations with respect to existing law.
Documentation of Congress's "perception" that a cause of action existed under the
CEA is considerably more tenuous than its perception that a private right of action existed
under section 503. The dissenting opinion in Curran noted that "[i]n the hundreds of pages
of committee hearings and reports that preceeded [sic] the 1974 amendments, the Court is
unable to discover even a single clear remark to the effect that the 1974 amendments would
create or preserve private rights of action." 102 S.Ct. at 1852. The majority was forced to
rely on the assumption that Congress was aware of existing case law. .d at 1839. The
legislative history of the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, on the other hand, is
replete with statements that a cause of action existed under section 503. Accordingly, Congress's perception of the existence of a cause of action under section 503 is entitled to even
more weight in ascertaining legislative intent than the Supreme Court gave to Congress's
perception of the law with respect to the CEA.
239. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 418 (1891); see also
Clarke v. FELEC Servs., 489 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Alaska 1980). In Clarke, the district
court relied upon the 1978 amendments in concluding that a cause of action should be implied under § 503. The court responded to the Fifth Circuit's argument in Rogers that "[a]n
assumption is not a law" by stating that "[wihile 'an assumption is not a law,' neither is a law
to be construed a nullity." Id
240. See notes 199-201 & accompanying text supra.
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instances, several years after the enactment of the statute conferring the
federal right, a provision for the discretionary award of attorneys' fees
was adopted. Finally, statements at the time of the subsequent adoption of the attorneys' fees provisions of both statutes intimated that
Congress intended, at the time of the enactment of the provision conferring the federal right, to create a private cause of action. 24 1
In Cannon, the Supreme Court relied, in part, on subsequent legislative history to support its conclusion that a cause of action existed
under Title IX.242 The subsequent legislative history of section 503
speaks with even greater clarity than does the subsequent history of
Title IX. Therefore, the legislative history of the 1978 amendments
may properly be invoked to find a congressional intent to imply a private right of action under section 503.
Several district courts have adopted this interpretation, relying
upon the 1978 amendments in concluding that an implied cause of action exists under section 503.243 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. Frio-Lay,Inc. 244 rejected attempts by the plaintiff to rely upon
the 1978 amendments.
The majority opinion in Rogers generally rejected, in effect, the
use of subsequent legislative history as a tool for discerning prior legislative intent. Focusing only on contemporaneous legislative history, 245
the court refused to find meaning in section 503 as a result of the later
statute and of remarks by individual members of Congress made at a
later time, stating: "What happened after a statute was enacted may be
history and it may come from members of Congress, but it is not part of
the legislative history of the original enactment." 246 Unfortunately, the
Rogers court misconstrued the function and application of subsequent
legislative history as defined in Cannon. Cannon expressly sanctioned
the use of later statutes and subsequent remarks by individual members
241. In Cannon, these subsequent statements regarding Title IX were made on the floor
of Congress during debate on the attorneys' fees legislation. See 441 U.S. at 686 n.7. In the
case of § 503, these statements were made both on the floor of Congress and in the relevant
committee reports. See notes 227-38 & accompanying text supra.
242. See 441 U.S. at 686 n.7 (1979).
243. See note 97 & accompanying text supra.
244. 611 F.2d at 1081-82.
245. Id at 1080. "in trying to learn Congressional intent by examining the legislative
history of a statute, we look to the purpose the original enactment served, the discussion of
statutory meaning in committee reports, the effect of amendments--whether accepted or
rejected-and the remarks in debate preceding passage." Id These remarks, together with
subsequent statements, reflect the Rogers court's preoccupation with contemporaneous legislative history to the almost total exclusion of subsequent legislative history.
246. Id
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of Congress to construe prior statutes. 247 Furthermore, although the
Rogers court was correct in noting that statements made by members
of Congress after the adoption of a statute are "not part of the legislative history of the original enactment," 24 8 limited reliance on such evidence to determine legislative intent has been clearly permitted by the
Supreme Court. 249
The Rogers court also objected specifically to the use of the 1978
amendments in construing section 503 on the grounds that those
amendments are "the product of members of a Congress so distant in
time from the enacting Congress that we cannot accept their remarks as
an accurate expression of the earlier Congress's intent. ' 25 0 This argument is not compelling. Although the interval in Cannon between the
act and the amendment was four years, the Supreme Court termed the
subsequent statements by the members of the later Congress "authoritative expressions" of the earlier Congress's intent. 25 1 The interval between the enactment of section 503 and the 1978 amendments is five
years. The passage of one extra year should not make the statements
made by the members of Congress in 1978 an inaccurate or unreliable
guide to the intent of Congress in 1973. Moreover, the fact that 341
members of Congress in 1973 were also members in 1978252 suggests
that the statement made during the consideration of the 1978 amendments are, contrary to the unsupported assertion in Rogers, "accurate
'253
expression[s] of the earlier Congress's intent.
Finally, although the Rogers court attempted to undermine the
significance of the 1978 committee reports, the court did not dispute
their meaning. Conceding the fact that both the House and Senate
Committee Reports in 1978 were predicated on the belief that a private
cause of action existed prior to the adoption of the 1978 amendments, 2 54 the court questioned the validity of the committees' belief
247. 441 U.S. at 686 n.7.
248. 611 F.2d at 1080.
249. See notes 197-201 & accompanying text supra.
250. 611 F.2d at 1082.
251. 441 U.S. at 686 n.7.
252. See notes 235-38 & accompanying text supra.
253. The Rogers majority also attacked the use of 1978 House and Senate Committee
Reports as of little value in determining the intent of Congress in 1973 because "'[t]he Committee' in 1978 or 1979 is not the [same] committee that recommended the legislation enacted in 1974 [sic]." 611 F.2d at 1082. In response, the dissenting judge in Rogers noted that
"1 of the 16 members of the relevant Senate Committee in 1978 were on the committee in
Further, 15 of the 37 members of the relevant House
1973 when the Act was passed .....
committee in 1978 were also on the Committee in 1973." Id at 1101 n.32 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
254. Id at 1082.
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that a private remedy existed. The court asserted that it may "fairly be
said that the 1978 Committees of both Houses assumed that a private
cause of action had somehow been created in the past," and concluded,
"[a]n assumption is not a law." 255 Relying in part on Rogers, three
other circuits have advanced similar arguments with respect to the 1978
256
amendments.
The argument of these courts cannot withstand close analysis. By
their use of the word "assume," defined as "[t]o take for granted, or
without proof,"2 57 these courts in effect state that the 1978 reports are
unreliable guides to congressional intent because they are not based
upon "proof," which is defined as "[alny fact or circumstance which
25 8
leads the mind to the affirmative or negative of any proposition.
These courts might be justified in implicitly asserting, as to those
legislators who were not members of the relevant committees in 1973,
that they took "for granted" or "without proof' the intention of the
members of Congress in enacting section 503 in 1973. With respect to
individuals who were committee members in 1973, however, it is untenable to assert that they took "for granted" or "without proof' their
own intention concerning the creation of an implied cause of action five
years earlier. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports were
adopted without dissent, and therefore represent the views of all the
individuals who were members of those committees in 1973 and 1978.
Accordingly, the belief, which is reflected in the committee reports of
both Houses, that a cause of action existed prior to the 1978 amendments, cannot be so readily dismissed by asserting that it is, in the
words of Rogers, "an assumption not shown to have been war255. Id (emphasis added).
256. See Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United
Air Lines, 662 F.2d 120, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d
1226, 1243 (7th Cir. 1980). The Simpson court introduced an additional argument relating
to legislative intent. The court acknowledged that the attorneys' fee provision in the original
bill "specifically listed § 503 as one of the sections covered by the fee provision," id at 1242,
and noted that the Senate report expressly indicated that the attorneys' fee provision related
to § 503. Id The court nevertheless concluded: "With the exception of the language from
the Senate report, we find all these excerpts from the legislative history ambiguous in their
reference to § 503." Id This argument appears strained. Certainly, both the House report,
see note 227 & accompanying text supra, and the debate on the floor of the Senate unambiguously support the implication of a private remedy. See notes 229-35 & accompanying
text supra. Furthermore, even the majority in Rogers conceded that the reports in both the
House and the Senate were predicated on the belief that a private cause of action exists
under § 503. See note 254 & accompanying text supra.
257. WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 168 (2d ed. 1961).
258. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (5th ed. 1979).
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ranted."'' 59 In view of the relatively large number of legislators who
were members of the relevant committees in both 1973 and 1978,260 the
views expressed by these members regarding their own prior intent provide cogent support for the conclusion that Congress did intend to create a private cause of action in 1973.
In summary, the 1978 amendments and their legislative history
reveal that Congress believed it had created a cause of action at the
time of the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act. First, the Committee
Reports of both the House and Senate Committees indicate that attorneys' fees are to be available in actions or proceedings to enforce sec-

tion

503.261

Those reports are premised on the existence of a private

cause of action created at an earlier time. Second, the Senate Committee Report expressly referred to existing private rights of action in the

context of section

503.262

Third, the debate on the floor of the Senate

makes it clear that private rights of action under section 503 existed
prior to the adoption of the 1978 amendments. 263 Fourth, Congress's
inclusion of the attorneys' fees provision in the 1978 amendments attests to its belief that it had created a private cause of action at an
earlier time.2 64 Finally, none of the 341 members of Congress in 1973
and 1978, nor any of the members of the relevant committees in both
years, objected, during the consideration and adoption of the 1978
amendments, to the many statements that expressly or implicitly indi265
cated that Congress had previously created a cause of action.
In response to all the indications in the 1978 amendments and
their legislative history that Congress had previously created an implied cause of action, those who oppose implication have only one indication of congressional intent to deny a cause of action: the maxim of
expresslo unius.266 With the exception of Transamerica,the Supreme
259. 611 F.2d at 1082.
260. See note 250 supra.
261. See notes 227-28 & accompanying text supra.
262. See note 228 & accompanying text supra.
263. See notes 229-38 & accompanying text supra.
264. See notes 239-40 & accompanying text supra.
265. See notes 235-38 & accompanying text supra.
266. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d.at 1085; Langman v. Western Elec.
Co., 488 F. Supp. 680, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 468 F. Supp.
934, 937 (E.D. Ohio 1979).
In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit invoked exfpressio unius as evidence of the fact that the
implication of a private remedy would be inconsistent with the underlying legislative
scheme. Accordingly, that court concluded, among other things, that the third Cori factor
was not satisfied. 611 F.2d at 1084-85. In Transamerica,444 U.S. at 20-21, Cannon, 441
U.S. at 711, and Cort, 422 U.S. at 82 n.14, the Supreme Court considered the maxim of
expressio unius as bearing on legislative intent. Accordingly, even though Rogers considered
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Court has rejected the use of this principle in the absence of supporting
legislative history; 267 such history does not exist with respect to section
503. Even if it is assumed that expressio unius may be invoked without
additional supporting legislative history, that principle must yield to
"clear contrary evidence of legislative intent. ' 268 The subsequent legislative history of the 1978 amendments provides sufficiently "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent" to overcome the presumption of
expressio unius that the express administrative remedy contained in
section 503 was intended to be the exclusive remedy for violations of
that section.
In conclusion, when the 1978 amendments are employed in the
construction of section 503, it becomes clear that Congress did intend to
create a private cause of action under that section, and accordingly, the
second of the four Cort tests is satisfied.

The Third Cort Test
Is it consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme
269
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?

In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court elaborated
upon its criteria for satisfaction of the third Cori test: "[A] private remedy should not be implied if it would frustrate the underlying purpose
expressio unius with respect to the third Cort factor, it is treated as if it were invoked in
connection with the second Cort factor.
267. See notes 110-73 & accompanying text supra.
268. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974); see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 20. In
the district court opinion in Rogers, the court also argued that the repeated unsuccessful
attempts to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e- 17
(1976 & Supp. III 1979), to include the handicapped as a protected class demonstrated Congress's intent to preclude private suits under § 503. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp.
200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977), af'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 887 (1980). Title VII creates an express cause of action, in certain circumstances, to
individuals who believe they were victims of the discrimination proscribed by Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976). If Title VII were amended to include the handicapped, they
would clearly have a private cause of action. Notwithstanding this fact, the reasoning of the
district court in Rogers is deficient. Implicit in this reasoning is the premise that there is a
causal connection between the grant of an express cause of action if Title VII were amended
to include the handicapped and the rejection of the "perennial attempts" to amend Title VII.
The district court in Rogers, however, did not establish this causal connection.
There are other, equally plausible, explanations of Congress's failure to amend Title
VII to include the handicapped. Under § 503, only federal contractors are required to take
affirmative action with respect to the handicapped, as opposed to the far larger number of
employers subject to the strictures of Title VII. See S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1979). See note 308 infra.
269. 422 U.S. at 78.
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of the legislative scheme. On the other hand, when that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its implication under the
statute."27 0 Some ambiguity remains whether the test will be satisfied as
long as there is no inconsistency between implication and the underlying legislative scheme, or, alternatively, whether this test requires a
showing that implication is necessary to achieve the statutory purpose.
Under either standard, however, implication of a cause of action under
section 503 meets the applicable standard.
Several courts that have declined to imply a cause of action under
section 503 rested their conclusion, at least in part, on their perception
of "inconsistencies" between a private remedy and the statutory
scheme envisioned by Congress. 271 Analysis of those purported inconsistencies reveals that none involves a true conflict with the legislative
goals of section 503, and, therefore, none militates against implication
under that section.
In Cannon, the Supreme Court reasoned that, because of conditions surrounding Title IX, the implication of a private remedy was not
merely consistent with the statutory purpose, but also especially "appropriate" or "efficient" in achieving that purpose. 272 Some plaintiffs
seeking the implication of a cause of action under section 503 have
advanced arguments parallel to those successfully made in Cannon.273
Although not all of these analogies are well founded, their rejection
does not bar implication of a right of action. Instead, the question
whether a private cause of action is consistent with the underlying legislative purposes of section 503 must be decided on other grounds. Implication under section 503 is not inconsistent with the legislative
scheme envisioned by Congress. In addition, there are strong indica270. 441 U.S. at 703 (footnote omitted).
271. In addition, some courts have relied upon the principle of expressio unius in finding
an implied private remedy inconsistent with the express administrative remedy provided in
§ 503(b). See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1085; Simon v. St. Louis County, 23
F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1315, 1321 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Coleman v. Noland Co., 21 F.E.P. Cases
(BNA) 1248, 1249 (W.D. Va. 1980). As a practical matter, the substance of this argument is
the same as the expresslo unius argument under the second Cori factor: the existence of an
express administrative remedy and the statute's silence with respect to a private remedy
demonstrate Congress's intent to preclude private litigation. See notes 91-94 & accompanying text supra.
272. 441 U.S. at 704-08.
273. See, eg., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1104-06 (Goldberg, J., dissenting);
Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp. 1165, 1171-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hart v.
County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 75-76 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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tions that Congress perceives private lawsuits as necessary to achieve
adequate and effective enforcement of section 503.
The Effect of Litigation on Conciliation
Several courts have asserted that the possibility of private lawsuits
would adversely affect the process of informal conciliation that Congress intended as the principal method of securing compliance with the
affirmative action obligations imposed by section 503.274 For example,
in Wood v. Diamond State Telephone Co.,27S the court concluded that
the implication of a private cause of action would be inconsistent with
the conciliation efforts of the DOL. The court stated that "the existence
of independent federal litigation, even if stayed during the administrative process, and the possibility of relief independently fashioned by a
federal court is likely to impair the effectiveness of the administrative
' 276
conciliation process.
Although the preferred method of resolving disputes resulting
from alleged violations of section 503 is informal conciliation,277 it does
not follow that private litigation is necessarily inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the statute. Neither the contemporaneous nor the
subsequent legislative history of section 503 suggests that Congress perceived any inconsistency in creating a framework both for administrative enforcement under section 503(b) 278 and for private enforcement
as suggested by the provision for awarding attorneys' fees to successful
litigants in section 505(b). 279 To the contrary, both the Senate report
and the Senate debates indicate that Congress viewed private suits as a
necessary supplement to administrative enforcement. z80 Congress's attitude supports the view that these alternative remedies are compatible.
The DOL has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the implication of a cause of action under section 503. The DOL initially
274. See Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d at 1243 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1084; Coleman v. Noland Co., 21 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1248,
1249 (W.D. Va. 1980); Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Ohio
1979); Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003, 1009-10 (D. Del. 1977).
275. 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977).
276. Id at 1009-10.
277. The DOL's regulations provide: "In every case where any complaint investigation
indicates the existence of a violation of the affirmative action clause or these regulations, the
matter should be resolved by informal means, including conciliation and persuasion, whenever possible." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28(a) (1980).
278. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976).
279. Id § 794a(b) (Supp. III 1979).
280. See S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 30,346 (1978)
(remarks of Sen.Cranston). See notes 228-38 & accompanying text supra.
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supported the implication of a cause of action,281 but after the change
in the Administration in 1981, it reversed its position to oppose implication. The DOL's original position was set forth in an amicus curiae
brief that it filed in Chaplin v. ConsolidatedEdison Co. 282 There the
DOL maintained that the existence of a private cause of action would
not only not interfere with conciliation, but would actually facilitate
attempts to resolve section 503 disputes through conciliation, because
the "specter of litigation would have a sobering effect on the parties
involved. '283 The Chaplin court concluded, "In light of the position of
the Department of Labor, clearly a rational view, the claimed potential
is not a
for interference with the work of the administrative agency
28 4
valid reason for finding no implied private right of action."
In 1981, the DOL adopted the position that a cause of action
should not be implied under section 503.285 The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is typically accorded
great deference by the courts. 286 The Supreme Court, however, has
recognized limitations on the applicability of this principle.
In GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,287 the Court had to determine
whether a particular company policy violated Title VII's prohibition of
sex-based discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has enforcement responsibility for Title VII,288
originally indicated that the practice in question did not violate this
statute. 28 9 The EEOC290subsequently issued guidelines in which it took
the opposite position.
In evaluating the significance to be accorded the EEOC's second
position, the Supreme Court cited an earlier case in which it stated that
"[t]he weight of such a judgment..

. will depend upon.

.

. [in part] its

consistency with earlier and later pronouncements .... -291 Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that in another context it had "declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they
281. See Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
282. Id
283. Id at 1172. The DOL took the same position in California Paralyzed Veterans
Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F.. Supp. 125, 131 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
284. 482 F. Supp. at 1172.
285. DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 144, at A-8-9 (July 7, 1981).
286. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
287. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
288. See id at 140-41.
289. Id at 142-43.
290. Id at 140-41 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10b (1975)).
291. Id at 142 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency." 292 Accordingly,
the DOL's current position need not be accorded great deference.
The principal reason for the DOL's original position was that its
limited resources would not enable the DOL expeditiously to resolve
and investigate its "large backlog of Section 503 administrative complaints." 293 The problem of limited resources is analogous to the
problems that motivated the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) to maintain in Cannon that private enforcement would
provide effective assistance in achieving the purposes of Title IX.294
Relying on HEW's own evaluation, the Supreme Court concluded in
Cannon that the implication of a private cause of action under Title IX
was not inconsistent with the underlying legislative scheme, 2 95 which
contemplates significant reliance on administrative enforcement. 296 In
addition, the Supreme Court feared that the lack of enforcement resources would leave Title IX violations unvindicated, as well as inter297
fere with the orderly functioning of HEW.
Statistics provided by the DOL suggest that analogous problems
are likely to arise if a private cause of action is not implied under section 503. In 1980, the DOL investigated only about half of the section
292. Id at 143.
293. Affidavit of Weldon J. Rougeau, then Director of the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs, Department of Labor, at 2, Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482
F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), reprintedin Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1108-09,
Appendix.
294. See 441 U.S. at 706-08. HEW argued that it did "not have the resources necessary
to enforce Title IX in a substantial number of circumstances." Id at 708 n.42.
295. Id. at 706-08.
296. Id at 683-84.
297. "[T]he agency may simply decide not to investigate-a decision that often will be
based on a lack of enforcement resources, rather than on any conclusion on the merits of the
complaint. In that case, if no private remedy exists, the complainant is relegated to a suit
under the Administrative Procedure Act to compel the agency to investigate and cut off
funds. But surely this alternative is far more disruptive of HEW's efforts efficiently to allocate its enforcement resources under Title IX than a private suit against the recipient of
federal aid could ever be." Id at 707 n.41 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court's willingness in a civil rights context to accept the lack of adequate
enforcement resources as a basis for implying a private remedy is not a new position. In
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Supreme Court implied a cause of
action in favor of private citizens under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1976). That Act expressly provided for enforcement only through suits
brought by the Attorney General. Id § 1973j(d), (e). Noting the Attorney General's limited
staff, the Court concluded: "The guarantee of § 5 that no person shall be denied the right to
vote for failure to comply [with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act] might well prove an
empty promise unless the private citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforcement of the
prohibition." 393 U.S. at 557 (footnote omitted).
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503 complaints filed with

it.298

1349

The DOL projected the filing of 2025

complaints in 1981.299 The DOL, however, planned to investigate only
745.300 Thus, almost two-thirds of the complaints filed under section
503 by handicapped individuals would not even be investigated, much
less resolved on their merits. An analogous situation convinced the
Supreme Court in Cannon to imply a private remedy. The Court's
reasoning is equally applicable to section 503 and strongly militates in
favor of private enforcement of that statute.
Because of delays in the judicial system, it would appear unlikely
that the implication of a cause of action under section 503 would make
more'!rompt the resolution of disputes under that statute. Implication
of a cause of action, however, would at least ensure that disputes concerning alleged violations of section 503 were resolved on their merits.
As section 503 is a civil rights statute, this result is more consistent with
the legislative scheme envisioned by Congress than is exclusive reliance
on administrative enforcement. 30 1 Congress fails to perceive any conflict between conciliation through the administrative process and private lawsuits. The implication of a private cause of action, therefore,
should not be deemed inconsistent with the underlying statutory
scheme on that ground. The DOL's inadequate enforcement resources
militate in favor of the implication of a private cause of action. Acceptance of the conclusion that private enforcement of section 503 is a necessary supplement to administrative enforcement demonstrates that
private litigation and administrative enforcement, with the latter's emphasis on conciliation, are not inconsistent.
The Effect of Private Suits on Contractors
The court in Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Railway30 2 concluded
that a private cause of action was inconsistent with the legislative
scheme because the possibility of damages arising out of a private lawsuit, as opposed to the sanctions available in a government action,
would be too insignificant to assist in achieving compliance by federal
298. During the fiscal year, 2500 complaints were filed, of which the DOL investigated
only 1287. 6 MAINSTREAM 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1981) (information from DOL documents) (periodical published by Mainstream, Inc., Wash., D.C. 20005).
299. Id In 1980, the DOL estimated that it would receive 1900 complaints, and it actually received 2500.
300. Id
301. Section 503(b) has not been modified since the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act
in 1973. Section 503(b) directs that the DOL "shall promptly investigate such complaint and
29 U.S.C.
shall take such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant ....
§ 793(b) (1976).
302. 468 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Ohio 1979).
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contractors with section 503. Therefore, according to the court, a pri'30 3
vate cause of action would be of "marginal utility.
The court's position in Anderson is vulnerable on two grounds.
First, the court's logic is flawed. When a range of sanctions exists, the
threat of the imposition of relatively less severe sanctions will not necessaril be an inadequate deterrent to the proscribed conduct. Accordingly, the conclusion in Anderson that private suits necessarily will be
ineffective in securing compliance just because other more drastic sanc3 °4
tions exist is untenable.
Second, the conclusion that, as a practical matter, private suits
would not be useful in obtaining compliance with section 503 is doubtful. Congress obviously views private litigation in situations involving
other types of employment discrimination, such as sex and race, as useful in securing compliance with the statutory prohibitions. 30 5 There is
no readily apparent reason that private litigation should be less successful with respect to the handicapped. Thus, analysis of Anderson indicates that its conclusion that private lawsuits would be ineffective in
securing compliance with section 503 is unpersuasive.
In Wood v. Diamond State Telephone Co. ,306 the court concluded
that a private cause of action should not be implied for precisely the
opposite reason to the one posited by the Anderson court-that implication would expose federal contractors to too great a burden. The burden feared is the possibility of de novo litigation. 307 In the past,
Congress has not viewed the imposition of de novo litigation upon employers in other civil rights contexts as too oppressive or burdensome.
Title VII, for example, exposes a large number of employers to the pos30 8
sibility of administrative proceedings followed by de novo litigation.
303.

"The present regulations authorize the Secretary [of the DOL] to withhold contract

payments, cancel the contract, and disbar [sic] a contractor. The possibility of civil liability
for damages in an action brought by a private individual would be of minimal value to
motivate a contractor to comply with affirmative action requirements when such a civil liability is compared with the sanctions which the Secretary can impose. Thus, a private right
of action would be of marginal utility in enforcing section 503." Id at 939.
304. In addition, an individual contemplating unlawful conduct for which a range of
sanctions exists has no way of knowing prior to that conduct which of those sanctions will be
imposed in his or her case.
305.

See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17

(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
306. 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977).
307.
d. at 1009. If a private remedy were implied under § 503 on a de novo basis, any
disputed issues of fact would be determined anew in the district court, which would not be
bound by factual determinations made by the DOL. Cf Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S.
840, 843-45 (1976) (de novo proceedings under Title VII).
308. The DOL has estimated that "Title VII applies to approximately 700,000 private
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This suggests that Congress does not view the possibility of de novo
litigation as inherently burdensome.
Moreover, under section 503, the possibility of de novo litigation
does not place an unreasonable burden on federal contractors, because,
unlike employers covered by Title VII, federal contractors have voluntarily chosen to do business with the federal government and thereby
have agreed to comply with the affirmative action clause in their contracts. Thus, the "exposure" of a federal contractor to de novo litigation is not so burdensome as to be inconsistent with the legislative
scheme of section 503.
NeitherAnderson nor Wood demonstrates any significant inconsistency between the implication of a private cause of action and the
legislative scheme contemplated by Congress. Notwithstanding the diametrically opposed views of these two courts, the implication of a private cause of action would provide a reasonable and useful
complement to administrative action in securing the civil rights of the
handicapped.
Private Suit as a Necessary Alternative to "Severe"
Administrative Sanctions
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court justified
the implication of a private cause of action, in part, in its determination
that a private remedy might be more "appropriate" and efficient in
achieving the statutory goal of effective individual protection against
discrimination 30 9 than would the only express remedy provided in Title
IX, the termination of federal financial assistance. 31 0 Termination of
financial assistance, the Court observed,
is... severe and often may not provide an appropriate means of
accomplishing [the statutory purpose of providing "individual citizens" with protection from discrimination] if merely an isolated violation has occurred. In that situation, the violation might be
remedied more efficiently by an order requiring an institution to acemployers of 15 or more employees and to approximately 30,000 units of state and local
government and 50,000 national and local labor unions." S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st

Sess. 3 (1979). Section 503 applies only to 300,000 federal contractors. Id
309. The Court noted that two statutory goals were intended to be promoted by Congress in enacting Title IX,which prohibits sex-based discrimination by certain educational
institutions receiving federal financial assistance. Congress did not want to use federal resources to support discriminatory practices, and Congress "wanted to provide individual
citizens effective protection against those practices." 441 U.S. at 704.
310. The statute provides that this remedy can be invoked by a federal agency empowered to extend federal financial assistance to any education program or activity if it determines, after a formal hearing, that the recipient of such assistance violated the provisions of
Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
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3 11
cept an applicant who had been improperly excluded.
The Supreme Court was concerned with the possibility that, when an
"isolated violation" occurred, the agency charged with enforcement
might refuse to cut off federal funding, thus allowing the discriminatory practice to go uncorrected. The Cannon court, therefore, concluded that a private action would be well suited to remedy an isolated
violation.
The dissenting opinion in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,312 along with
the decisions in Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co. 3 13 and Hart v.
County of Alameda, 3 14 all advance this argument to support implication of a private right of action under section 503. Regulations promulgated by the DOL provide that the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP), the DOL agency that enforces section
503, may impose various administrative sanctions for violations, including withholding of progress payments, termination of existing contracts, and debarment from future federal contracts. 31 5 The dissenting
judge in Rogers stated that, if there has been an isolated violation of
section 503, "the OFCCP will be hesitant to invoke the rather draco' '31 6 Both the Chaplin31 7
nian remedies provided for in its regulations.
31 8
and Hart courts make comparable statements. Unfortunately, the
analogy to Cannon is not well drawn. The analogy rests upon the unarticulated and erroneous assumption that the OFCCP's only options are
either to invoke one or more of the three remedies or to leave unrectifled the violation of section 503.
In Cannon, the "severe" remedy of a termination of federal
financial assistance was the remedy expressly prescribed by Congress in
the statute. 31 9 In section 503, however, Congress delegated to the President the authority to prescribe sanctions for violating section 503.320
The President, in turn, delegated that authority to the DOL. 32 1 Thus,
the three sanctions that might be imposed for violation of section 503
were created by the DOL in its regulations and are therefore subject to
311.
312.

441 U.S. at 705 (footnotes omitted).
611 F.2d 1074, 1104 n.40 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

889 (1980).
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

482 F. Supp. 1165, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
485 F. Supp. 66, 75-76 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28 (1980).
611 F.2d at 1105 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
482 F. Supp. at 1171-72.

318.

485 F. Supp. at 75-76.

319.

20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).

320.

29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).

321.

Exec. Order No. 11,758, 3 C.F.R. 841 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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amendment by the DOL. Accordingly, the DOL could provide for less
severe sanctions, which it would be more likely to invoke if there were
an isolated violation.
Furthermore, the DOL's existing regulations permit it to seek judicial enforcement of the affirmative action clause in the event it determines that a violation of that clause has occurred. 322 The DOL,
therefore, could seek legal or equitable relief less "severe" than the
three remedies expressly provided for in its regulations. Accordingly,
the implication of a private cause of action cannot be justified on the
ground that it is a necessary alternative to the "draconian remedies"
created in the DOL's.regulations.
In Hart v.County of Alameda,323 the court adopted the Cannon
analogy, despite its express recognition of the alternative remedies
available. The Hart court focused only on the prescribed administrative remedies, characterizing those remedies as "rather severe procedures [that] simply do not provide the kind of narrow, specific relief
'324
appropriate to remedy individual instances of discrimination.
The court's concern with the appropriateness of the administrative
process does not appear well founded. In OFCCP v. E.E. Black,
Ltd ,325 the first final Administrative Order issued under section 503, a
federal contractor was found to be in violation of the affirmative action
clause in failing to hire a particular apprentice. 32 6 The relief granted in
the final Administrative Order required the federal contractor to
"make, in writing, an immediate offer of employment as an apprentice
carpenter" to the complainant. 3 27 In addition, the contractor was required to make the complainant whole, a remedy that included back
pay. 328 Only if the federal contractor failed to comply with these directives within thirty days would its contracts with the government, and its
322. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28(b) (1980).
323. 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
324. Id at 75-76 (footnote omitted).
325. 19 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1624 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1979). E.E. Black sought judicial
review of the Administrative Order by initiating a suit against the Secretary of Labor and
others. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D.Hawaii 1980). Black alleged,
among many other things, that the Administrative Order was based upon an incorrect and
unlawful standard for determining whether an individual had a handicap under. the Rehabilitation Act. Id at 1096. Black's motion for summary judgment was denied. Id at 1104.
326. The contractor refused to hire the complainant as a carpenter's apprentice because
a medical examination revealed that he had a back condition which might lead to future
injury. The contractor conceded that the complainant was capable of performing the job at
the time he was refused employment.
327. 19 F.E.P. Cases at 1636.
328. Id at 1636-37.
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eligibility for future contracts, be terminated. 329 The relief granted the
complainant seems to provide the "narrow, specific relief' that the
Hart court feared might not result from the administrative enforcement of section 503.330
Moreover, as opposed to the effect of the termination of assistance
in Cannon,33 1 the final Administrative Order in E.E. Black did provide
the complainant with the relief that he sought: the federal contractor
was required to offer him employment and to give him back pay. Thus,
administrative enforcement can provide an appropriate and efficient
remedy for violations of section 503. Such relief would not be significantly different from that available in a private lawsuit. The availability of other appropriate remedies does not mean, of course, that a
private cause of action should not be implied under section 503. It
means, rather, that the implication of a cause of action under that statute cannot be justified on the ground that administrative enforcement
of section 503 cannot produce a result as "appropriate" or "efficient" as
a private lawsuit could produce.
Private Right of Action: Necessary Participation by the Complainant
In Cannon, the Supreme Court asserted in a footnote that it had
"never withheld a private remedy where the statute explicitly confers a
benefit on a class of persons and where it does not assure those persons
the ability to activate and participate in the administrative process contemplated by the statute. ' 332 The court in Chaplin v. Consolidated
329. Id. at 1636.
330. It is useful to distinguish the concept of "relief' from the concept of "sanction."
"Relief' refers to what the complainant seeks, such as an offer of employment and other
forms of redress. "Sanction" refers to the consequences that flow from failure to comply
with the Administrative Order. It is possible that relief can be "narrow" and "specific" even
where the sanction imposed is "severe." As a practical matter, the "severity" of contract
termination and debarment will vary depending upon the economic significance to the federal contractor of his dealings with the federal government. In any event, it does appear that
administrative enforcement can give appropriate relief for a violation of § 503. Of course,
the limited experience with administrative enforcement of § 503 requires that this conclusion
be regarded as tentative.
331. In Cannon, the Supreme Court indicated its concern that, even if the recipient of
federal financial assistance were found to have engaged in sex-based discrimination, the
termination of that financial assistance would not give the person subject to the discrimination what he or she wanted most: admission to the educational institution in question. See
441 U.S. at 704-06. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned, because the statutorily prescribed remedy of a cutoff of financial assistance would not necessarily provide the relief

sought, "the violation of Title IX might be remedied more efficiently by an order [in a private lawsuit] requiring an institution to accept an applicant who had been improperly excluded." Id at 705 (footnote omitted).
332. Id at 707 n.41.
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Edison Co. 333 and the dissent in Rogers v. Frito-Lay,Inc. 334 advanced
an analogous argument with respect to section 503, suggesting that,
while the statute allows the complainant to initiate the proceedings,
neither the statute nor the regulations permit the complainant to
335
participate.
The regulations promulgated by the DOL to implement section
503 do, however, appear to permit the complainant to participate in the
proceedings. If an investigation of a complaint indicates a violation of
the affirmative action clause and the Director of the OFCCP proposes
to withhold progress payments, terminate existing contracts, or debar
the contractor from future contracts, the contractor is entitled to a formal hearing. 336 The rules of procedure contemplate participation by
interested parties, 337 providing in relevant part that "persons.

.

.shall

have the right to participate as parties if the final Administrative Order
could adversely affect them.

. .

and such participation may contribute

'338
materially to the proper disposition of the proceedings.
A handicapped complainant who alleges that a federal contractor
has violated the affirmative action provision in a federal contract obviously could be adversely affected by a final Administrative Order that
concluded that the contractual provision had not been violated. Accordingly, the handicapped complainant would be entitled to participate, subject only to the condition that "such participation may
contribute materially to the proper disposition of the proceeding." As a
practical matter, the complainant will almost certainly be a witness at
the hearing; it is unlikely, therefore, that this condition would not be
satisfied. Therefore, a private cause of action need not be implied to
permit participation by the complainant.

Opening the Floodgates of Litigation

In his dissenting opinion in Cannon, Justice Powell articulated his
fear that the continued application of what he regarded as the Court's
nonrestrictive approach to implication would open the "floodgates" of
333. 482 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
334. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
335. Id at 1105 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); 482 F. Supp. at 1172.
336. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.29(a) (1980). The DOL regulations incorporate by reference the
rules of procedure employed in hearings conducted under Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R.
339 (1964-1965 compilation), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 1232 (1976). See 41
C.F.R. § 60-741.29(b)(3) (1980).
337. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-30.14 to .24 (1980).
338. Id § 60-30.24(a)(2).
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litigation. 339 In support of his position, he noted that within the fouryear interval between the Cort and Cannon decisions the courts of appeals had implied private causes of action in twenty decisions, implying
remedies under fourteen separate statutory provisions. 340 In view of
these facts, Justice Powell's fear of a flood of cases cannot be lightly
dismissed.
In addition, the majority opinion in Cannon expressed displeasure
at the necessity for federal courts continually to resolve suits predicated
on implied causes of actions, suggesting that "[w]hen Congress intends
private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory
rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates
those rights." 34 1 Similarly, the majority opinion in Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington342 demonstrated an increasing impatience with implied
343
causes of action litigation.
It is possible that the Court's more restrictive approach in
Transamericais at least partially attributable to the Court's displeasure
with the seemingly endless stream of implied private right of action
cases it must consider. Congress clearly has the power, however, subject only to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, to impose,
modify, or repeal liability, and to provide for the enforcement of that
liability through private lawsuits. Congress might unwisely choose to
create expressly a cause of action that produces a deluge of lawsuits. If
the judicial system is overwhelmed as a result, the remedy is through
the electoral process, and not through a refusal by the courts to apply
the law.
If Congress has created no express remedy, the crucial issue is the
intent of Congress to create a private remedy, not the delaying effect of
the cause of action. If it is clear that Congress intended to permit private lawsuits, then this decision, although not expressed in the statute,
should not be overruled by the courts under the guise of the floodgates
argument. On the other hand, if there is not a clear indication of legislative intent that private lawsuits be permitted, then a cause of action
should not be implied.
When the intent to permit private suits is clearly manifested, as it
339.
340.
341.
342.

441 U.S. 677, 740-42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 741-42.
Id at 717 (Stevens, J.).
442 U.S. 560 (1979).

343. "Once again, we are called upon to decide whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one. During this Term alone, we have been asked to undertake this task no fewer than five times in cases in which we have granted certiorari." Id

562 (Rehnquist, J.).

at
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is in the case of section 503, then the floodgates argument should not be
considered; this argument could only serve to deflect inquiry from the
real issue, legislative intent. The floodgates argument is irrelevant to
the question of the existence of a private cause of action.
Conclusion
As all four Cort tests are satisfied, 344 a cause of action may properly be implied under section 503. Nevertheless, the clear weight of
judicial authority, as exemplified by all of the section 503 decisions of
the circuit courts of appeals, is to the contrary. The appellate decisions
appear to reflect accurately the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on
proof of congressional intent to create an implied private remedy. The
1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, however, do provide the
necessary proof.
It is useful here to take a broader perspective. As the clear weight
of judicial authority is against implication under section 503, an observer might conclude that the courts' resolution of the issue would
please the congressional opponents of private enforcement. One rather
remarkable fact, however, has gone unnoticed in both the cases and the
relevant commentary: there is no evidence of any congressional opponents to private enforcement of section 503. Research concerning the
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, the 1974 amendments, and the
1978 amendments, as well as their respective legislative histories, has
failed to disclose even one statement, at any time, by any member of
Congress, that could even remotely be described as manifesting hostility towards the enforcement of section 503 by private suits. Courts that
have prohibited implication have concluded that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action under section 503 without the
benefit of a single statement supporting this position. All the express
statements of legislative intent concerning implication under section
503 support the implication of a private remedy.
The only significant indication of a legislative intent to deny a private cause of action under section 503 is the existence of the express
provision for administrative enforcement in section 503(b) together
with the principle of exfpressio unius. That principle, like other rules of
statutory construction, is only a -presumption. In the case of section
503, that presumption is based on silence. Expressio unius assumes that
the legislature's silence is purposeful and that it indicates an intention
to preclude all remedies other than those expressed.
344. Regarding the fourth Cori factor, see note II & accompanying text supra.
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Silence, however, is ambiguous. In view of the ambiguous nature
of silence, the Supreme Court has been simply unwilling to apply expressio unius absent some supporting legislative history demonstrating
that the express remedies were intended to be exclusive. The exception,
of course, is Transamerica,in which the Supreme Court invoked the
maxim of expressio unius despite a completely silent legislative history.
This case, however, is distinguishable from the factual and legal situation surrounding section 503. Although the contemporaneous legislative history of section 503 is silent with respect to private enforcement,
subsequent legislative history forcefully supports implication. In Transamerica, no comparable subsequent legislative history of the Investment Advisers Act was available.
The ultimate issue is which is the more reliable guide to Congress's
intent with respect to private enforcement of section 503: its silence in
1973, or its express subsequent statements in 1978. The courts that
have relied on expressio unius to conclude, after the adoption of the
1978 amendments, that a cause of action should not be implied under
section 503, have accorded Congress's initial silence greater deference
than its express subsequent statements. This resolution of the issue is
wholly inappropriate. Congress's silence in 1973 is at most ambiguous,
while the totality of the statements made and actions taken in connection with the adoption of the 1978 amendments is rather plainly unambiguous. In the context of the implication of a private cause of action
under section 503, silence should not reign; express legislative intent
should.

